India Quarterly, Volume 80, Issue 1, Page 133-148, March 2024.
In the history of politics, states have viewed military intervention as one of their tools of foreign policy. However, many scholars have not agreed on the effectiveness of military means in achieving the foreign policy objectives of states. Like other states, Ethiopia and Kenya have used the military as a means of foreign policy and tested their tools in Somalia practically. However, the effectiveness of their foreign policy tool has not been studied. That is why this article’s main objective is to analyse the effectiveness of Ethiopian and Kenyan foreign policies that used military interventions to achieve their foreign policy goals in terms of outcomes. In doing so, the article used a comparative case study methodology. Besides, the ‘good enough’ approach is the proper theoretical lens that is used in this article to comprehend Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s operational outcomes. The analysis comes to the conclusion that both Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s military deployments in Somalia generally failed to accomplish their foreign policy goals. Accordingly, the findings reveal that using hard power as a tool of foreign policy without combining soft power is largely unsuccessful, as indicated by Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s military engagement in Somalia.

India Quarterly, Volume 80, Issue 1, Page 26-54, March 2024.
Is Afghanistan a lost frontier? A superficial look might conform to this notion, given the continued state of unrest and instability, rampant hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy and unemployment. In this reflective discourse, however, we highlight a brighter (largely overlooked) aspect: her mineral reserves, estimated at nearly USD 1 trillion, including some of the world’s richest lithium and rare earth elements (REEs), with high market value and critical for global climate combat policymaking (decarbonisation of infrastructure and attaining the net-zero target). By the same token, here, we offer a bird’s-eye view of the Afghan mineral wealth, with special emphasis on lithium and REE, which, if rightly harnessed, could be an engine of economic growth and national development. In its present state of operations, however, that future seems a distant myth as the Afghan mining/mineral sector is undermined by a web of interlocking systemic barriers, including (a) a totalitarian regime, (b) institutional bottlenecks, (c) a lack of social integration (human rights violation and neoliberal outlook) and (d) a lack of foreign investments. To that end, we reflect on the world experience of nations where mineral resources have become engines of economic growth and national development, which may inspire the present Afghan leadership. Rejuvenating the mining/mineral sector may help the leadership simultaneously advance towards multiple targets: (a) stabilising the economy, (b) meeting multiple UN Sustainable Goals, (c) helping mobilising nation- and peace-building efforts and (d) contributing to global climate action. Collectively, these may help redeem the lost reputation in the eyes of the international community and get rid of the economic sanctions. Here, we offer a vision to the present Afghan leadership to rejuvenate the mineral sector: (a) an enabling business environment (increased ease of business and security), (b) a unified water-power supply framework (hydropower development), (c) a participatory ecosystem (an integrated social-ecological-technological framework) and (d) restricting illicit mineral trade (enforcing rule of law and equity). To that end, we call for a data revolution to kickstart the systems’ thinking exercise (facilitating research, exploration and mineral processing).

India Quarterly, Volume 80, Issue 1, Page 9-25, March 2024.
Politically astute and organisationally deft, the Taliban forged ‘antagonistic cooperation’ with key regional players who courted the movement vigorously as it sought to reinvent itself as ‘Taliban 2.0’. However, two years into the rule of ‘Taliban 2.0’, the chasm between rhetoric and reality has widened. This article disaggregates the idea of ‘Taliban 2.0’, arguing that subtle differences notwithstanding the Taliban is an ideological movement which demonstrates a remarkable contiguity in showing fidelity to its hardline ideology manifested in its attitudes towards women, deployment of violence and links with transnational actors. Domestic political actors too stuttered in responding to the Taliban’s momentum amid a dramatically reconfigured geo-political landscape, a glaring power asymmetry, factionalism within opposition ranks and the rise of new actors like the Daesh which attempted to fill the void.

India Quarterly, Volume 80, Issue 1, Page 117-132, March 2024.
The Indian patent model is a powerful and well-balanced model that not only complies with the requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) but also considers domestic needs and national interest. This study endorses India’s approach of fully availing itself of public health flexibilities provided in the TRIPS Agreement. India’s well thought out patent model contradicts with the pro-patentee approaches taken by the European Union, the USA and Japan. This study emphasises the challenges and pressures faced by the Indian patent model because of the closer harmonisation agenda being pushed by some high-income countries through bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. This study argues that in order to effectively respond to harmonisation demands, India needs to be proactive in terms of building regional coalitions and transmitting its model to other like-minded Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries with similar interests. This is a viable approach because most of the ASEAN countries, despite different levels of development and industry, are facing similar challenges in terms of universal access to affordable medicines.