India Quarterly, Volume 80, Issue 1, Page 55-71, March 2024.
The assertion of (territorial) nationalism by Nepal has serious implications for its bilateral relationship with India. Once dominant, the singular narrative of the upper-caste Hindu Parbatiya nationalism is increasingly encountering competing narratives emerging from the marginalised Janajatis and the Madhesis of Nepal. Accordingly, several nationality sentiments that were sidelined earlier have now become salient. While the India factor in these competing perspectives of nationalist discourses in Nepal appears to be subtle (but important), the growing territorial dimensions to it invariably locates India in a prominent position. This article investigates the implications of the changing dynamics of Nepal’s nationalism on its bilateral relationship with India. Looking at the internal dynamics of nationalism discourses in Nepal, the article offers a critical analysis of the territorial disputes between India and Nepal, and its implications on nationalism in Nepal and on the bilateral relationships between India and Nepal.
Category Archives: India Quarterly
Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy in the Context of Geopolitical Turbulence
India Quarterly, Volume 80, Issue 1, Page 149-163, March 2024.
The purpose of the paper is to reveal the impact of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine on the foreign policy of Kazakhstan, as well as to consider the potential development of Kazakhstan’s relations with China, Turkey, the United States and others. Analysis, induction, deduction and synthesis serve as the main methods of research on this problem. The article discloses the problem of preservation by Kazakhstan of a multi-vector, neutral policy in relation to its partners in modern conditions. The strategic programme documents adopted by the government of Kazakhstan were also studied. The analysis of interstate trade turnover for 2022 was used to determine relations between Kazakhstan and Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Separately, it was considered whether the Russian Federation poses a military threat to Kazakhstan. The materials of the article are of practical and theoretical value for political scientists and specialists in the field of international relations, and researchers of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan interested in the features and aspects of the implementation of a multi-vector policy by its leadership.
The purpose of the paper is to reveal the impact of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine on the foreign policy of Kazakhstan, as well as to consider the potential development of Kazakhstan’s relations with China, Turkey, the United States and others. Analysis, induction, deduction and synthesis serve as the main methods of research on this problem. The article discloses the problem of preservation by Kazakhstan of a multi-vector, neutral policy in relation to its partners in modern conditions. The strategic programme documents adopted by the government of Kazakhstan were also studied. The analysis of interstate trade turnover for 2022 was used to determine relations between Kazakhstan and Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Separately, it was considered whether the Russian Federation poses a military threat to Kazakhstan. The materials of the article are of practical and theoretical value for political scientists and specialists in the field of international relations, and researchers of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan interested in the features and aspects of the implementation of a multi-vector policy by its leadership.
Book review: Satinder Kumar Lambha, In Pursuit of Peace: India–Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 620-622, December 2023.
Satinder Kumar Lambha, In Pursuit of Peace: India–Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers. Penguin Random House, 2023, pp. 384, ₹799, ISBN: 9780670097944.
Satinder Kumar Lambha, In Pursuit of Peace: India–Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers. Penguin Random House, 2023, pp. 384, ₹799, ISBN: 9780670097944.
Book review: V. Srinivas, G20@2023: The Roadmap to Indian Presidency, One Earth. One Family. One Future
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 618-620, December 2023.
V. Srinivas, G20@2023: The Roadmap to Indian Presidency, One Earth. One Family. One Future. Pentagon Press, 2023, pp. 290, ₹995, ISBN 9789390095742.
V. Srinivas, G20@2023: The Roadmap to Indian Presidency, One Earth. One Family. One Future. Pentagon Press, 2023, pp. 290, ₹995, ISBN 9789390095742.
Editorial
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 459-460, December 2023.
India’s G20 Presidency: Implications for the Latin American Region in the Framework of the Global South
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 514-524, December 2023.
The turbulent unipolar world order is on the descendant, paving the way for a more representative multipolar global order. One of the early signs of this trend was the emergence of the G20 as a forum seeking to shape and strengthen the international economic and world governance architecture. Since then, the G20 along with other multilateral forums like the BRICS has played a role in consolidating the identities and interests of its Global South member states. The article discusses the debate over using ‘Global South’ identity instead of ‘Third World’ image. It also provides insights into Latin American perspectives on India’s G20 Presidency and as a leader of the Global South, given the historical and contemporary strategic significance of New Delhi in the emerging multipolar world order. The article also reflects on how India engages and interacts with Latin America in light of China’s growing influence in the region.
The turbulent unipolar world order is on the descendant, paving the way for a more representative multipolar global order. One of the early signs of this trend was the emergence of the G20 as a forum seeking to shape and strengthen the international economic and world governance architecture. Since then, the G20 along with other multilateral forums like the BRICS has played a role in consolidating the identities and interests of its Global South member states. The article discusses the debate over using ‘Global South’ identity instead of ‘Third World’ image. It also provides insights into Latin American perspectives on India’s G20 Presidency and as a leader of the Global South, given the historical and contemporary strategic significance of New Delhi in the emerging multipolar world order. The article also reflects on how India engages and interacts with Latin America in light of China’s growing influence in the region.
Between Rewards and Risks: India as Host of the 2023 G20 Summit
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 476-487, December 2023.
India’s hosting of the 2023 G20 summit presents a number of serious tests. Taking on the presidency of the G20 offers India the prospect of enormous rewards related to an enhanced role in world politics. As this article lays out, however, the hosting function exposes India to risks of three types relating to organisational capacity and status. The highest profile of these risks comes from the changing external environment under which the New Delhi G20 will meet, set against a background of complicating geopolitical tensions. Moreover, beyond the highly charged stakes attached to this shifting external context, the basic organisational responsibilities of holding the presidency of the G20 in New Delhi present a second serious challenge. The hosting function comes with enormous logistical issues that are especially sensitive for India in terms of peer status. Hosting a global summit of this type—that is to say, an institution constructed without the cushion of legitimacy attached to formal international organisations—is also complicated by India’s self-identity. Performing the role of host conveys a message of India’s equality of peer status vis-à-vis the other structurally important members in the G20. Nonetheless, in playing up this (insider) side of India’s identity, the other side of India’s (outsider) identity that privileges India’s solidarity with the Global South and the privileging of aspirational multilateralism through the United Nations (UN) is potentially compromised. My article has two intertwined purposes. On the one hand, it examines the major tests that exist for India regarding the contextual, procedural, and institutional meaning dynamics of the G20, analysing the differentiated nature and implications of each of these challenges in turn. On the other hand, the article offers some insights concerning the techniques of how India has either addressed (or could address) the three tests and so ensure a positive reception for the summit process.
India’s hosting of the 2023 G20 summit presents a number of serious tests. Taking on the presidency of the G20 offers India the prospect of enormous rewards related to an enhanced role in world politics. As this article lays out, however, the hosting function exposes India to risks of three types relating to organisational capacity and status. The highest profile of these risks comes from the changing external environment under which the New Delhi G20 will meet, set against a background of complicating geopolitical tensions. Moreover, beyond the highly charged stakes attached to this shifting external context, the basic organisational responsibilities of holding the presidency of the G20 in New Delhi present a second serious challenge. The hosting function comes with enormous logistical issues that are especially sensitive for India in terms of peer status. Hosting a global summit of this type—that is to say, an institution constructed without the cushion of legitimacy attached to formal international organisations—is also complicated by India’s self-identity. Performing the role of host conveys a message of India’s equality of peer status vis-à-vis the other structurally important members in the G20. Nonetheless, in playing up this (insider) side of India’s identity, the other side of India’s (outsider) identity that privileges India’s solidarity with the Global South and the privileging of aspirational multilateralism through the United Nations (UN) is potentially compromised. My article has two intertwined purposes. On the one hand, it examines the major tests that exist for India regarding the contextual, procedural, and institutional meaning dynamics of the G20, analysing the differentiated nature and implications of each of these challenges in turn. On the other hand, the article offers some insights concerning the techniques of how India has either addressed (or could address) the three tests and so ensure a positive reception for the summit process.
Indo-Iran Relations: Impact of Third-party Influence
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 594-610, December 2023.
Close historical, social, cultural and economic ties and geographical proximity present ample opportunity for both Iran and India to advance their national interests by forging strong bilateral relations. Rich in energy resources, particularly oil and gas, Iran can meet India’s growing demand for energy while serving as an international transit route in India’s march towards global prominence and power. India, on the other hand, can help Iran in its testing times to end its isolation and contribute to its economic development. The ground reality, however, is different. India, while maintaining some level of cooperation with Iran, has been increasingly looking towards other countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq to meet its energy demands. Based on descriptive-analytical research methodology, the article posits that the shift in the Indian foreign policy paradigm from Nehruism during the Cold War period to pragmatism in the post-Cold War period has negatively impacted Iran–India relations. A number of additional factors hinder the development of positive Iran–India relations. The present article considers the role of third countries such as the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and China as important factors impeding positive Tehran–Delhi relations.
Close historical, social, cultural and economic ties and geographical proximity present ample opportunity for both Iran and India to advance their national interests by forging strong bilateral relations. Rich in energy resources, particularly oil and gas, Iran can meet India’s growing demand for energy while serving as an international transit route in India’s march towards global prominence and power. India, on the other hand, can help Iran in its testing times to end its isolation and contribute to its economic development. The ground reality, however, is different. India, while maintaining some level of cooperation with Iran, has been increasingly looking towards other countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq to meet its energy demands. Based on descriptive-analytical research methodology, the article posits that the shift in the Indian foreign policy paradigm from Nehruism during the Cold War period to pragmatism in the post-Cold War period has negatively impacted Iran–India relations. A number of additional factors hinder the development of positive Iran–India relations. The present article considers the role of third countries such as the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and China as important factors impeding positive Tehran–Delhi relations.
Walking a Tightrope: Assessing India’s Engagements with G20 and BRICS
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 525-534, December 2023.
Both the G20 and BRICS forums were established roughly at around the same time. This article examines India’s engagement with both these forums in the context of its complex position as a leader representing the Global South and a newly emerged power seeking an elevated status in international diplomacy. The study begins by highlighting India’s initial scepticism towards the G20 and its preference for the transformative potential of BRICS. However, under Modi, India’s approach gradually shifted towards embracing the G20, driven by multiple factors. The article also explores the relevance of BRICS for India amidst its growing inclination towards the G20. It argues that India cannot afford to undermine BRICS, as it would strengthen China’s claims as the sole representative of the Global South. However, its aim to balance China within the BRICS has proven to be challenging owing to recent developments that have complicated matters for India.
Both the G20 and BRICS forums were established roughly at around the same time. This article examines India’s engagement with both these forums in the context of its complex position as a leader representing the Global South and a newly emerged power seeking an elevated status in international diplomacy. The study begins by highlighting India’s initial scepticism towards the G20 and its preference for the transformative potential of BRICS. However, under Modi, India’s approach gradually shifted towards embracing the G20, driven by multiple factors. The article also explores the relevance of BRICS for India amidst its growing inclination towards the G20. It argues that India cannot afford to undermine BRICS, as it would strengthen China’s claims as the sole representative of the Global South. However, its aim to balance China within the BRICS has proven to be challenging owing to recent developments that have complicated matters for India.
Assessment of Possible Economic Alignment Between G20 Nations with Special Focus on India, G7 and G12: A General Equilibrium Analysis
India Quarterly, Volume 79, Issue 4, Page 535-551, December 2023.
The article analyses the ex-ante effects of India’s possible alignment with G20 countries. The study considers G7, G12 and G20 countries as separate blocks. The study analyses India’s bilateral tariff and non-tariff liberalisation, free flow of factors of production, Global Value Chain (GVC) participation, output-oriented technological progress in manufacturing, transport and communication and the introduction of shipping technology in India. The study considers liberalisation in G7 standalone, G12 standalone, G20 standalone and also G20 comprehensive liberalisation. The study also considers India’s bilateral standalone liberalisation with G7, G12 and G20 countries separately using computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis with the help of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 10 database. The overall results indicate that strengthening of GVC standalone in the G20 region may bring maximum welfare to the region. Further, the sectors which may gain the most seem to be grain crops, meat and meat products, textiles and apparel, etc., and in terms of factors of production, all other factors of production would gain but land and natural resources seem to lose in terms of real returns to factor of production. Addressing issues related to factor movements and policies strengthening GVCs can bring about relatively higher growth and welfare, respectively, in the G20 nations as compared to other trade and industrial policies.
The article analyses the ex-ante effects of India’s possible alignment with G20 countries. The study considers G7, G12 and G20 countries as separate blocks. The study analyses India’s bilateral tariff and non-tariff liberalisation, free flow of factors of production, Global Value Chain (GVC) participation, output-oriented technological progress in manufacturing, transport and communication and the introduction of shipping technology in India. The study considers liberalisation in G7 standalone, G12 standalone, G20 standalone and also G20 comprehensive liberalisation. The study also considers India’s bilateral standalone liberalisation with G7, G12 and G20 countries separately using computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis with the help of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 10 database. The overall results indicate that strengthening of GVC standalone in the G20 region may bring maximum welfare to the region. Further, the sectors which may gain the most seem to be grain crops, meat and meat products, textiles and apparel, etc., and in terms of factors of production, all other factors of production would gain but land and natural resources seem to lose in terms of real returns to factor of production. Addressing issues related to factor movements and policies strengthening GVCs can bring about relatively higher growth and welfare, respectively, in the G20 nations as compared to other trade and industrial policies.