Category Archives: Credit and Banking

Global Banks and Synthetic Funding: The Benefits of Foreign Relatives

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Abstract

This paper examines the effect of dislocations in foreign currency (FX) swap markets (“CIP deviations”) on bank lending. Using data from UK banks we show that when the cost of obtaining swap-based funds in a particular foreign currency increases, banks reduce the supply of cross-border credit in that currency. This effect is increasing in the degree of banks' reliance on swap-based FX funding. Access to foreign relatives matters as banks employ internal capital markets to shield their cross-border FX lending supply from the described channel. Partial substitution occurs from banks outside the UK not affected by changes in synthetic funding costs.

Credit Markets with Time‐Inconsistent Agents and Strategic Loan Default

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Abstract

We study credit contracts under a life-cycle setting where time-inconsistent agents lack the internal commitment to stick to consumption plans and external commitment to repaying loans. With unrestricted credit, agents with only internal commitment problems may overborrow. If, additionally, they face external commitment problems, lenders endogenously impose borrowing limits similar to the ability-to-repay rules consumer financial protection agencies impose. Even with restricted credit access, except in exceptional cases, agents suffering from the twin commitment problems can achieve, at most, fully sophisticated allocations. The government can achieve the first-best allocations if and only if it is assisted with endogenously imposed borrowing limits.

Financial Crises as a Phenomenon of Multiple Equilibria and How to Select among Them

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Abstract

When equilibrium is indeterminate (i.e., not unique), applied theory often obtains uniqueness either via ad hoc sunspots or via global games. This paper highlights the relative merits of a third selection mechanism—best-response dynamics (BRD)—in the context of various financial crisis frameworks. For example, in the context of a bank run, selection via BRD is preferred (to ad hoc sunspots) because it provides an explicit coordination narrative and (to global games) because it accounts for the fact that depositors realistically may decide to join or leave a bank's queue upon observing its length.

Real Interest Rates, Bank Borrowing, and Fragility

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Abstract

How do real interest rates affect financial fragility? We study this issue in a model where bank borrowing is subject to rollover risk. A bank's optimal borrowing trades off the benefit from investing additional funds into profitable assets with the cost of greater risk of a run by creditors. Changes in the interest rate affect the price and amount of borrowing, which influence bank fragility in opposite directions. Thus, the marginal impact of changes to the interest rate on bank fragility depends on the level of the interest rate. Finally, we derive testable implications that may guide future empirical work.

Tax Austerity: Does It Avert Solvency Crises?

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Abstract

Many high-debt countries are adopting tax austerity, whereby governments raise the tax rate as their debt levels rise with the hope to dispel future solvency crises. This paper investigates the impact of tax austerity on government debt solvency. A solvency crisis occurs once adverse shocks push the debt above its effective debt limit, the maximum level of debt that the government can repay. I show that the position of the effective debt limit depends on tax austerity. I find that high-debt countries like Italy that undergo tax austerity could lower their effective debt limit and induce a solvency crisis.

Credit Guarantee and Fiscal Costs

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Abstract

This paper studies the effectiveness of government-backed credit guarantees to the infrastructure sector. We propose a two-sector model with financial intermediary frictions so that infrastructure producers rely on bank loans to finance production. Governments can intervene in the credit market by providing a partial guarantee. We find that a credit guarantee increases infrastructure production, leading to a high fiscal multiplier in the longer run. In the near term, however, higher infrastructure-sector wages crowd out private-sector labor supply. Importantly, the higher leverage associated with credit expansion raises nonperforming loans, and this channel is particularly pronounced if the government-backed credit guarantees linger.

Endogenous Cycles in Collateralized Credit

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Abstract

This paper presents a simple and tractable equilibrium model, where collateralized credit emerges under limited commitment. We show that even if there is no time variation in fundamentals, credit trade can fluctuate endogenously over time. In our theory, credit fragilities are associated with endogenous fluctuations in trade probabilities, collateral values, and lending volumes.

Cryptocurrency, Security, and Financial Intermediation

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Abstract

In recent years, the use of cryptocurrencies has increased. As these currencies continue to play a larger role, they eventually will be an important component of banking system activity. Moreover, in addition to the standard role of financial intermediaries to facilitate lending, intermediaries can be valuable firms that help provide safekeeping of tokens. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate these important functions in a microfounded model of monetary exchange. Furthermore, we also consider the possibility that central banks issue their own digital currencies that may affect the level of intermediation in the private banking system.

Credit Market Frictions and Coessentiality of Money and Credit

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Abstract

We explore how credit market frictions matter for the coessentiality of money and credit. Limited commitment calls for credit limits that are tailored according to borrowers' productivity. Under an adverse selection problem caused by asymmetric information, however, lenders impose the credit limit of the low-productivity borrower onto the high-productivity borrower. If productivities differ sufficiently between borrowers, the high-productivity borrower is credit-constrained and is willing to hold money to compensate for the deficiency of their credit limit, whereas the low-productivity borrower is not. This implies the coessentiality of money and credit in the sense that their simultaneous use improves welfare.

Introducing New Forms of Digital Money: Evidence from the Laboratory

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Abstract

Central banks may soon issue currencies that are entirely digital (CBDCs) and possibly interest bearing. A strategic analytical framework is used to investigate this innovation in the laboratory, contrasting a traditional “plain” tokens baseline to treatments with “sophisticated” interest-bearing tokens. In the experiment, this theoretically beneficial innovation precluded the emergence of a stable monetary system, reducing trade and welfare. Similar problems emerged when sophisticated tokens complemented or replaced plain tokens. This evidence underscores the advantages of combining theoretical with experimental investigation to provide insights for payments systems innovation and policy design.