The (Ir)Relevance of Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers for U.S. Business Cycle Fluctuations

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Abstract

We estimate a medium-scale model with and without rule-of-thumb consumers over the pre-Volcker and the Great Moderation periods, allowing for indeterminacy. Passive monetary policy and sunspot fluctuations characterize the pre-Volcker period for both models. In both subsamples, the estimated fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers is low, such that the two models are empirically almost equivalent; they yield very similar impulse response functions, variance, and historical decompositions. We conclude that rule-of-thumb consumers are irrelevant to explain aggregate U.S. business cycle fluctuations.

A Kinked‐Demand Theory of Price Rigidity

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Abstract

I provide a microfounded theory for one of the oldest, but so far informal, explanations of price rigidity: the kinked-demand curve theory. Kinked-demand curves arise when some customers observe at no cost only the price at the store they are at. At the microlevel, the kinked-demand theory predicts that prices should be more likely to change if they have recently changed, and more flexible in markets where customers can more easily compare prices. At the macrolevel, it captures a part of the inflation/output trade-off that is not shifted by inflation expectations and therefore persists in the long run.

Catch Up with the Good and Stay Away from the Bad: CEO Decisions on the Appointment of Chief Sustainability Officers

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Abstract

Why do some chief executive officers (CEOs) appoint chief sustainability officers (CSOs) for their firms while others do not? We answer this question by examining CEOs' attention allocation to competition for stakeholders' approval, which can be triggered by both industry peers' corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). An increase in peers' CSR triggers CEOs' attention allocation by observing that peers have improved and thus pose a competitive threat to their own firms. An increase in peers' CSiR triggers CEOs' attention allocation by perceiving that stakeholders will demand more for sustainability and thus place higher sanctions on their own firms in the future. CEOs' attention allocated to industry peers' CSR and CSiR, in turn, can increase their perceived importance and urgency of appointing CSOs for their firms to ‘catch up with the good’ (responsible peers) and to ‘stay away from the bad’ (irresponsible peers). We also theorize the moderating roles of CEOs' motivational attributes, such that predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are more (less) likely to appoint CSOs as peers increase CSR (CSiR), and future-oriented CEOs are more (less) likely to appoint CSOs as peers increase CSiR (CSR).

Government Spending, Debt Management, and Wealth and Income Inequality in a Growing Monetary Economy*

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Abstract

This paper compares the impact of government investment and government consumption on macroeconomic aggregates and inequality when the government deficit is money-financed while maintaining a fixed debt-money ratio. Real aggregate quantities are independent of the debt-money ratio, as is wealth inequality, but income inequality is impacted. We also investigate the impact of these two forms of government expenditure on the macroeconomic aggregates and distributions, illustrating their sharply contrasting effects on the tradeoffs they entail. While government investment is more effective in increasing the growth rate and moderating inflation, it has a more adverse effect on long-run income inequality.

Wealth, Portfolios, and Nonemployment Duration

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Abstract

We use administrative data on individual balance sheets in Denmark to document how an individual's financial position affects job search behavior. We look at the effect of wealth at the entry into unemployment on the exit rate from unemployment as well as the effect on the subsequent match quality. The detailed data allow us not only to distinguish between liquid and illiquid parts, but also to decompose each of them into assets and liabilities. The decomposition of wealth into these four components is key to understanding how wealth affects job finding rates. In particular, we show that liquid assets reduce the probability of becoming reemployed, but we do not see an effect of liquid liabilities or the illiquid wealth components, while interest payments speed up reemployment. The results on subsequent match quality in form of job duration and wages are mixed.