Corporate transparency among government suppliers: Implications for firm valuation

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Abstract

Corporate transparency has a positive impact on firm valuation, as predicted by agency theory; however, the transparency of strategically important government suppliers is not rewarded with higher valuations as the market expects politically sensitive firms to be inherently more transparent. The association between transparency and valuation among politically sensitive firms is consistent with the political cost hypothesis. We address endogeneity concerns using propensity score matching, Heckman's self-selection models and entropy balancing. Our findings offer novel insights, suggesting that the influence of transparency on corporate valuation varies with political sensitivity – a significant consideration for both finance professionals and scholars.

Optimal capital structure with supplier market power

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Abstract

We use a real-option model to study the effect of input supplier's market power on a firm's capital structure, and identify the Nash equilibrium outcome (firm's investment and financing policies and its supplier's pricing policy). When its supplier has market power, the firm will reduce leverage ratio and delay investment. This can help explain why observed leverage ratios are lower than in traditional capital-structure models (without supplier market power). Firm value can be increased by the vertical acquisition of the supplier, which would also result in a higher leverage ratio. This helps explain the observed increase in leverage ratios after acquisitions.