International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 648-666, September 2023.
In recent years, many countries have experienced remunicipalization in the public service sector, especially in the fields of water and urban waste management. Using a multiple-case design, examining five successful urban waste management remunicipalizations in Italy, this study investigates the triggers, key success factors, and results of this process. We find that remunicipalization is triggered by the simultaneous occurrence of motivations and opportunities, and the presence of one or a few fully committed actors. This process, in turn, results in significant improvements in a company’s performance from a triple bottom line perspective, provided that certain key success factors—regarding the municipality, the utility and its management, and stakeholder relationships—are met. The external context provides legal and institutional conditions that affect the overall process, triggers, and results.Points for practitionersRemunicipalization debate needs an in-depth analysis of municipalities that have experienced this process and insights into the triggers, processes, and impact of remunicipalisation. Experiences unfold through three main phases. Efficiency and meeting performance targets are important but should be balanced with other values linked with the well-being of communities. The process is triggered by simultaneous motivations and opportunities and by one or a few fully committed key actors. Remunicipalization induces significant firm performance improvements from a triple bottom line perspective.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 757-774, September 2023.
This systematic literature review analyses the body of knowledge on the budgeting practice known as participatory budgeting (PB). This review identifies and analyses a dataset of 139 English-language papers focused on PB in the public sector published over three decades (1989–2019) in academic journals of different disciplines. The findings shed new light on PB, by systematizing this body of knowledge and explaining the PB idea journey. A research agenda is also set by clarifying overlooked areas of research and practical interests.Points for practitionersThe review provides a conceptual model to cope with specific issues in each phase of a PB journey, and it also sheds light on the role of political and managerial actors.Traditional and new themes to design a PB and implement participatory mechanisms are proposed.Practitioners can benefit from indications about the use of technological tools in mobilizing participation.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 613-631, September 2023.
Getting a grip on issues of administrative delegation is key to the performance of public organizations. The oversight game models delegation as a conflict of interest between an inspector and an inspectee to act in the interests of the former. This study tests alternative solutions to overcome ‘shirking’ in the oversight game. Specifically, we test the effect of external incentives, as implied by the game-theoretical solution, against the role of intrinsic factors, namely, public service motivation and job-related risk aversion. Evidence from a laboratory (N = 208) and survey experiment (N = 794) show that both the game-theoretical approach, which inspired new public management, and public service motivation, as its antithesis, fail to explain subjects’ behaviour. Instead, job-related risk aversion makes oversight more and ‘shirking’ less likely. This finding hints towards a more differentiated view of public employees’ risk attitudes to improve administrative delegation.Points for practitionersThe promise of new public management that oversight issues in administrative delegation disappear with setting appropriate extrinsic incentives is too simplistic. Public service motivation, on the other hand, which started as an antithesis of the self-interested bureaucrat, also fails to solve the issue of ‘shirking’ in administrative delegation. Instead, job-related risk aversion appears to improve administrative delegation, which presents a remarkable counterpoint to the popular opinion in public management that risk aversion is problematic for public organizations’ performance. Rather than avoid selecting risk-averse public employees generally, more attention might be paid to the domains of administrative decision-making in which such traits can be beneficial.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 791-807, September 2023.
In a Napoleonic country such as Italy, ministerial cabinets have traditionally served as central advisors in the politicised policy advisory system (PAS), while evidence-based policy-making has usually been marginal. Nevertheless, recent developments in political systems have pushed for the pluralisation of the Napoleonic PAS toward a stronger demand for scientific and expert advice. Against this backdrop, the role of government research institutes (GRIs) as advisors represents an interesting change that could potentially fuel the development of an evidence-based approach in a period of changing advisory practices. We investigate these developments through a case study concerning 20 Italian GRIs that are engaged as influential advisors or recruited to support implementation through policy work. We obtained evidence through document analysis, in-depth interviews, and a questionnaire administered to the 20 GRIs. The overall picture displays a shift in conceiving policy advice in the political system and opens the door to innovation.Points for practitionersEvidence-based policy making is expanding also in countries with scarce policy capacities.Government research institutes may be asked to perform different policy works, including evidence-based advice and also implementation tasks.The financial autonomy and reputation of the government research institute matter for their advisory role.Policy advice is described as the result of the matching between a contingent political demand and the offer of expert knowledge.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 722-740, September 2023.
The link between actual government performance and citizens’ performance perceptions has been controversial. Given the prevalence of negativity bias, however, the link between bad performance and citizens’ perceptions could appear to be strong. To explore this theoretically unconfirmed link, this study uses a quasi-experiment that contrasts a Japanese town in fiscal crisis, involving tax increases and service cuts, with a control village not in fiscal crisis. Using a difference-in-differences analysis with a careful retrospective pretest, it finds negative effects of the fiscal crisis on citizens’ process perception, while it shows no effects on citizens’ service satisfaction and trust in the mayor, council, and administrators. The study further finds positive associations between citizens’ performance perceptions and civic engagement. It discusses these findings to identify the boundary conditions in which a bad performance–negative perception link is likely to appear. Points for practitioners Psychology literature on negativity bias suggests that the causal links and mechanisms between bad performance and negative perceptions are stronger than those between good performance and positive perceptions.Not only citizens, but also politicians and administrators, hold negativity bias. Their blame-avoidance strategies could alleviate the growth of citizens’ negative perceptions with bad performance.Participatory governance might moderate the bad performance–negative perception link by placing citizens in a performance-improvement process and promoting their interaction with government officials.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Ahead of Print.
Public administration research is actively exploring alternatives for the General Red Tape (GRT) scale to measure red tape. Owing to increasing criticism on the GRT scale, scholars proposed the Three-Item Red Tape (TIRT) scale as an alternative. Using a repeated cross-sectional design, this article tests both scales in a before–after analysis of a major change in the organization of administration in a hospital. The results indicate that the GRT scale does not capture the resulting major change in red tape, which raises questions on the instrument's validity in a bottom-up research design within one organization. The TIRT scale, however, which measures red tape at the work environment level, does reflect the change in red tape but shows empirical weaknesses in its design. Additionally, by randomly assigning respondents to substantially different red tape definitions, this article shows that the red tape definition does not significantly impact respondents’ GRT ratings.Points for practitioners The predominantly used GRT scale is not able to capture an increase in red tape in a bottom-up intraorganizational research design in a hospital, which raises questions on the instrument's validity.A more recent alternative for the GRT scale, more specifically the TIRT scale, captures the increase in red tape but shows empirical weaknesses.The wording of the red tape definition does not impact respondents’ answers on the GRT scale.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 741-756, September 2023.
This paper analyses the powers and competences of the EU to standardise public sector accounting of the member states and to take other EU action in the field of public sector accounting. We argue that public sector accounting forms part of the administrative organisation of the member states that is not a core EU competence. EU initiatives such as the European Public Sector Accounting Standards project, which aim to increase transparency and comparability, therefore need to follow the rules set out for administrative matters in general. The study reveals on the one hand that EU actions are essentially limited to voluntary cooperation and influences of other policy areas. But on the other hand, it shows that they do not need to be limited to the initiatives currently driven by Eurostat. Points for practitionersThe future of the European Public Sector Accounting Standards project is uncertain. However, it is very unlikely that it will take the shape of a top-down set of readymade EU accounting standards that will force public administrations to adjust their inner workings. Public sector accounting is not (yet) a (typical) European policy, but simply a national one that the EU can support. The EU initiative can be considered as an opportunity for collaboration and knowledge sharing on how to increase transparency of public sector accounting.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 703-721, September 2023.
The prevalence of top-heavy bureaucracies in non-democracies cannot be explained by the theories of Parkinson, Tullock, Niskanen, or Simon or by classical managerial theories. When bureaucracy positions carry rents, the competition for promotion becomes a rent-seeking process. Borrowing the career-tournament theory framework from managerial scholarship, we argue that top-heavy bureaucracy resembles a tournament with too many finalists. When rent is centralized at the top (i.e. power centralization), as is the case in many non-democracies, the optimal bureaucracy should be top-heavy, accommodating and encouraging relatively more finalists at the top to compete for the final big prize. We provide suggestive evidence by analyzing ministry organizations in China (1993–2014) and Russia (2002–2015). After some fluctuations, the shape of Russian ministries eventually converged with that of China. In the steady state, their ministry shapes are far more top-heavy than what is prescribed by managerial theories. At the micro-level, ministry power centralization, measured by the perceived influence of the ministers, is correlated with ministry top-heaviness in Russia.Points for practitionersOur theory suggests that a top-heavy authoritarian bureaucratic structure naturally follows from a back-loaded sequential career tournament and an effort-maximizing bureaucratic leader. Our findings also suggest that Chinese and Russian ministries both converge to a highly top-heavy structure in the long run. We demonstrate that the top-heavy structure first arose during the planned-economy experiment in the Soviet Union. Our research sheds new light on public-sector reforms that aim to reduce bureaucracy top-heaviness in autocracies.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 775-790, September 2023.
Recent scholarship has focused on how coordination mechanisms are implemented by public sector organizations, thereby paying attention to coordination as a process. This article studies the coordination process that resulted in the implementation of the interministerial financial information system of the French central state—named Chorus. Chorus is a case of an unlikely coordination process rolled out in the non-conducive context of the French Napoleonic Administration. Chorus aimed at connecting all ministries’ administrative services to a shared information system, while ministries were previously using their own systems and applications. Based on the literature on mechanisms of coordination, and focusing on the role of existing institutions and the actors involved in the coordination process, the analysis has two main results. First, AIFE—“Agence pour l’informatique financière de l’État”, the agency in charge of the implementation of Chorus—steered the process by developing a stepwise network-based interministerial strategy. Second, the coordination steered by AIFE resulted in a transformative change of the French state's financial and accounting structures through a layering process of change. Thereby, the article contributes to the empirical analysis of public administrations’ recent changes toward increased coordination at the central level by studying recent reforms in France and their outcomes. Points for practitionersThis article shows that coordination processes within public sector organizations are context sensitive and depend on the behavior of the “agents of change” in charge of these processes. In contexts that are non-conducive to transformative change (e.g. siloed structures, presence of veto players), the set-up of agile, resourceful and autonomous change agents is key. When veto players may oppose structural change, the article suggests setting up network-based coordination processes aiming at incremental evolutions inducing transformative change.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 667-684, September 2023.
This article disentangles the country-specific institutional system at the macro level from individual-level attraction and socialization in measuring public service-oriented work motives across European countries through public–private sector comparisons. We argue that country-specific institutions shape the level of public service-oriented work motives of each country and thereby generate level differences across countries. In contrast, public–private sector differences, (i.e. gaps), in public service-oriented work motives within a country reflect aspects of individual-level attraction and socialization. We use the 2005 and 2010 waves of the European Working Conditions Survey and demonstrate that the levels and gaps are empirically distinct phenomena, contrary to current treatment in the literature. We conclude that the distinction between levels and gaps can advance understanding of the antecedents of public service-oriented work motives and support the institutional theory of public service-oriented work motives.Points for practitionersThis article argues and provides evidence for the fact that levels of work motives oriented towards public service that are visible in a cross-country comparison should not be confused with the gap of such work motives inside one country. This distinction is important because in countries where gaps between the sectors are almost non-existent and levels are generally high, interventions geared towards public service-oriented work motives are less likely to be effective.