Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
The party affiliation of cabinet ministers is a critical but neglected notion. While its application and theoretical centrality is indisputable in many research fields, explicit definitions are difficult to find, while operationalizations tend to rely on rudimentary categorizations. Departing from formulating a definition consistent with the party government model, we propose a flexible typology to categorize and rank variants of partisans both within and beyond consolidated parliamentary democracies. We show that the new approach can capture important unobserved dynamics well.
Category Archives: Party Politics:
An election too far: Why do MPs leave politics before an election?
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Why are members of parliament retiring? In most parliamentary systems, a substantial number of MPs decide, before every election, not to run again. Though the decision to leave politics is essentially personal, a broader look at a large sample of MPs can reveal the existence of structural factors such as an uneven playing field or other sources of discrimination that could explain why certain individuals stay while others leave. A survey of the current literature indicates that the empirical work on this topic is almost exclusively focused on the US Congress. There is thus a need to conduct more research in other contexts to generate a more general explanation of why MPs leave politics on their own terms. The current literature suggests that the decision to leave could be explained by a complex combination of variables that are personal, partisan, and contextual. The purpose of this article is to better understand why sitting MPs decide not to run for re-election in parliamentary systems, focusing on three Westminster systems: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand since 1945. Various factors play a role, but our results suggest that as time passes, parliamentarians simply become less prone to seeking reelection.
Why are members of parliament retiring? In most parliamentary systems, a substantial number of MPs decide, before every election, not to run again. Though the decision to leave politics is essentially personal, a broader look at a large sample of MPs can reveal the existence of structural factors such as an uneven playing field or other sources of discrimination that could explain why certain individuals stay while others leave. A survey of the current literature indicates that the empirical work on this topic is almost exclusively focused on the US Congress. There is thus a need to conduct more research in other contexts to generate a more general explanation of why MPs leave politics on their own terms. The current literature suggests that the decision to leave could be explained by a complex combination of variables that are personal, partisan, and contextual. The purpose of this article is to better understand why sitting MPs decide not to run for re-election in parliamentary systems, focusing on three Westminster systems: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand since 1945. Various factors play a role, but our results suggest that as time passes, parliamentarians simply become less prone to seeking reelection.
Mapping issue salience divergence in Europe from 1945 to the present
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Issue salience is a fundamental component of party competition, yet we know little about when, where, or why parties’ issue emphases converge or diverge. I propose an original operationalization of issue salience divergence, the extent to which parties’ issue emphases differ from each other in an election, that generates values at the party-election and country-election levels. I leverage data from party manifestos to calculate scores for 2,308 party-election combinations of 381 unique parties in 426 elections across thirty European countries, the most comprehensive dataset to date. I find that issue salience divergence is generally low and has starkly decreased over time, but countries and parties differ substantially. As an initial step in understanding these differences, I propose and test initial expectations of how party and democracy age, electoral systems, and party type alter the incentives for divergent issue salience.
Issue salience is a fundamental component of party competition, yet we know little about when, where, or why parties’ issue emphases converge or diverge. I propose an original operationalization of issue salience divergence, the extent to which parties’ issue emphases differ from each other in an election, that generates values at the party-election and country-election levels. I leverage data from party manifestos to calculate scores for 2,308 party-election combinations of 381 unique parties in 426 elections across thirty European countries, the most comprehensive dataset to date. I find that issue salience divergence is generally low and has starkly decreased over time, but countries and parties differ substantially. As an initial step in understanding these differences, I propose and test initial expectations of how party and democracy age, electoral systems, and party type alter the incentives for divergent issue salience.
Blurred positions: The ideological ambiguity of valence populist parties
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
While the diversity of populism has received considerable attention, surprisingly little is known about populist parties that defy clear-cut left-right categorization. We show that valence populist parties are non-positional and substantially different from both left-wing and right-wing populist parties. First, we demonstrate that valence populist parties deliberately take blurry positions on both the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of competition. Second, we show that such an ambiguity is counterbalanced by a disproportionate emphasis on anti-corruption appeals, the most paradigmatic example of a non-positional dimension. Our results have important implications for our understanding of varieties of populism, in particular, and the positional and non-positional competition strategies of political parties, in general.
While the diversity of populism has received considerable attention, surprisingly little is known about populist parties that defy clear-cut left-right categorization. We show that valence populist parties are non-positional and substantially different from both left-wing and right-wing populist parties. First, we demonstrate that valence populist parties deliberately take blurry positions on both the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of competition. Second, we show that such an ambiguity is counterbalanced by a disproportionate emphasis on anti-corruption appeals, the most paradigmatic example of a non-positional dimension. Our results have important implications for our understanding of varieties of populism, in particular, and the positional and non-positional competition strategies of political parties, in general.
Politically motivated interpersonal biases: Polarizing effects of partisanship and immigration attitudes
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
We demonstrate effects of political preferences on interpersonal interactions in the environment of the highly unstable and volatile party system of the Czech Republic. The effects of partisanship on interpersonal relations are compared to the effects of attitudes on a salient issue. Two experiments confirm the potential of political partisanship to affect the individual’s ingroup preferences and outgroup biases, which can influence willingness to converse with others in the context of an unstable party system. In a conjoint experiment, dis/agreement on immigration has comparable effects on interpersonal interactions. Avoidance of interactions with out-partisans is amplified when out-partisans talk about politics often. The patterns of ingroup preferences and outgroup biases are replicated in a trust game experiment. Both partisanship and immigration attitudes influence how subjects interact with others. Given the political context, the study provides a hard test of politically motivated ingroup and outgroup biases stemming both from party and policy preferences.
We demonstrate effects of political preferences on interpersonal interactions in the environment of the highly unstable and volatile party system of the Czech Republic. The effects of partisanship on interpersonal relations are compared to the effects of attitudes on a salient issue. Two experiments confirm the potential of political partisanship to affect the individual’s ingroup preferences and outgroup biases, which can influence willingness to converse with others in the context of an unstable party system. In a conjoint experiment, dis/agreement on immigration has comparable effects on interpersonal interactions. Avoidance of interactions with out-partisans is amplified when out-partisans talk about politics often. The patterns of ingroup preferences and outgroup biases are replicated in a trust game experiment. Both partisanship and immigration attitudes influence how subjects interact with others. Given the political context, the study provides a hard test of politically motivated ingroup and outgroup biases stemming both from party and policy preferences.
Ranking of candidates on slates: Evidence from 20,000 electoral slates
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Using over 20,000 electoral slates from municipal elections in the Czech Republic, we document that in proportional representation electoral systems political parties rank candidates on the slates systematically according to their valence, measured by educational attainment, and intra-party value, measured by political donations and membership. The observed patterns are consistent with market mechanisms where the party leaders benefit from the valence and intra-party value of candidates and offer slate positions (i.e. the probability of winning a mandate) in exchange. We show that candidates with high valence and those who possess more intra-party value are placed in better-ranked positions, despite the fact that candidates with more intra-party value, conditional on observables, tend to receive relatively fewer votes than candidates with low intra-party value. We further show that as a party expects to hold more council seats, the share of their candidates with higher intra-party value increases.
Using over 20,000 electoral slates from municipal elections in the Czech Republic, we document that in proportional representation electoral systems political parties rank candidates on the slates systematically according to their valence, measured by educational attainment, and intra-party value, measured by political donations and membership. The observed patterns are consistent with market mechanisms where the party leaders benefit from the valence and intra-party value of candidates and offer slate positions (i.e. the probability of winning a mandate) in exchange. We show that candidates with high valence and those who possess more intra-party value are placed in better-ranked positions, despite the fact that candidates with more intra-party value, conditional on observables, tend to receive relatively fewer votes than candidates with low intra-party value. We further show that as a party expects to hold more council seats, the share of their candidates with higher intra-party value increases.
The emerging fault line of alternative news: Intra-party division in Republican representatives’ media engagement
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Intra-party factionalism and media fragmentation have emerged as two major trends in U.S. politics, especially on the right. We explore potential connections between these developments by analyzing Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives’ engagement with far-right alternative news media during the 116th Congress. We develop three discrete measures to scale representatives’ engagement using hyperlinks to news media on Twitter, demonstrating their validity against existing positional data: roll-call voting, ideological caucus membership, and political rhetoric. We then apply our scales empirically, showing that representatives with further-right media engagement became increasingly radical in their online communication during the Trump presidency. Representatives with more moderate media engagement did not radicalize in this way. These results suggest a dynamic relationship that reflects the ‘dual function’ of elite-media relations, where partisan elites serve as receivers of information and transmitters of intra-party signals in a fragmented media environment.
Intra-party factionalism and media fragmentation have emerged as two major trends in U.S. politics, especially on the right. We explore potential connections between these developments by analyzing Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives’ engagement with far-right alternative news media during the 116th Congress. We develop three discrete measures to scale representatives’ engagement using hyperlinks to news media on Twitter, demonstrating their validity against existing positional data: roll-call voting, ideological caucus membership, and political rhetoric. We then apply our scales empirically, showing that representatives with further-right media engagement became increasingly radical in their online communication during the Trump presidency. Representatives with more moderate media engagement did not radicalize in this way. These results suggest a dynamic relationship that reflects the ‘dual function’ of elite-media relations, where partisan elites serve as receivers of information and transmitters of intra-party signals in a fragmented media environment.
Length of candidate lists and political careers: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazil
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
This paper provides causal estimates of the effects of increases in the size of candidate lists on the political careers of newcomers to the political arena. We explore an exogenous discontinuity in district magnitude that allows parties to expand their candidate lists in the Brazilian open-list local elections and find that the additional candidacies are allocated to weaker candidates, mainly newcomers, who end up occupying a significant share of the additional seats. We also find that the electoral experience provided by the additional candidacies increases the number of newcomers elected in their second attempt.
This paper provides causal estimates of the effects of increases in the size of candidate lists on the political careers of newcomers to the political arena. We explore an exogenous discontinuity in district magnitude that allows parties to expand their candidate lists in the Brazilian open-list local elections and find that the additional candidacies are allocated to weaker candidates, mainly newcomers, who end up occupying a significant share of the additional seats. We also find that the electoral experience provided by the additional candidacies increases the number of newcomers elected in their second attempt.
Who do Europeans want to govern? Exploring the multiple dimensions of citizens’ preferences for political actors in nine European countries
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Many studies have tried to identify citizens’ views about which actors should govern and how. These studies have mostly looked at support for citizens or independent experts being given a greater role. Recently, Hibbing, Theiss-Morse, Hibbing and Fortunato have proposed a new battery of 21 survey items capturing the dimensions along which citizens’ preferences for who should govern are organized. Testing their survey instrument among US respondents, they identified seven dimensions. In this study, we replicate their approach across nine European democracies, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands. The replication allows, first, to compare citizens’ preferences for political actors between the US and Europe, and within Europe. Second, it provides suggestions for how Hibbing and colleagues’ battery might be adapted and re-used in other countries, enabling further cross-national comparative research on citizens’ preferences for who should govern.
Many studies have tried to identify citizens’ views about which actors should govern and how. These studies have mostly looked at support for citizens or independent experts being given a greater role. Recently, Hibbing, Theiss-Morse, Hibbing and Fortunato have proposed a new battery of 21 survey items capturing the dimensions along which citizens’ preferences for who should govern are organized. Testing their survey instrument among US respondents, they identified seven dimensions. In this study, we replicate their approach across nine European democracies, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands. The replication allows, first, to compare citizens’ preferences for political actors between the US and Europe, and within Europe. Second, it provides suggestions for how Hibbing and colleagues’ battery might be adapted and re-used in other countries, enabling further cross-national comparative research on citizens’ preferences for who should govern.
Sycophants in 280 characters: Using Twitter to measure the authoritarian sentiment of presidential advisors in Turkey
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Top-level presidential advisor appointments provide would-be autocrats in backsliding democracies a quick and effective means to coopt elites and assemble an authoritarian coalition. Such appointments represent a mechanism for making promises of patronage that are more credible and more directly under the executive’s control than patronage facilitated by their party. Elites who join the executive’s coalition via such appointments have incentives to maintain their privileged access and therefore are more likely to match or even surpass the authoritarian sentiment of an autocratic executive. This research uses a sentiment analysis model trained with 2 years of Twitter data—between 2019 and 2021—to compare the authoritarian sentiment of Turkey’s major political parties and to examine differences between groups within Turkey’s ruling party. The evidence shows that President Erdogan’s advisors are significantly more authoritarian than the rest of the party, and, as such, they form an authoritarian vanguard within an already authoritarian party.
Top-level presidential advisor appointments provide would-be autocrats in backsliding democracies a quick and effective means to coopt elites and assemble an authoritarian coalition. Such appointments represent a mechanism for making promises of patronage that are more credible and more directly under the executive’s control than patronage facilitated by their party. Elites who join the executive’s coalition via such appointments have incentives to maintain their privileged access and therefore are more likely to match or even surpass the authoritarian sentiment of an autocratic executive. This research uses a sentiment analysis model trained with 2 years of Twitter data—between 2019 and 2021—to compare the authoritarian sentiment of Turkey’s major political parties and to examine differences between groups within Turkey’s ruling party. The evidence shows that President Erdogan’s advisors are significantly more authoritarian than the rest of the party, and, as such, they form an authoritarian vanguard within an already authoritarian party.