Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Political parties use electoral clientelism to augment their support in many societies around the world. Extensive research shows how parties use clientelism and how citizens’ attitudes towards clientelism are shaped by broad social and economic factors. However, we know little about how political parties can influence people’s attitudes towards clientelism. To address this gap in the literature, this article analyzes the extent to which the development of a party organization and the interactions of citizens with these organizations can favor the acceptance of electoral clientelism as a practice of the political game. The analysis uses individual-level data from an original nationwide survey conducted in 2021 on a national representative sample of 4313 respondents in Romania. The results indicate that political parties, through their activities and networks, are not only main users of clientelism but also important drivers for its acceptance in society.
Category Archives: Party Politics:
Is there clarity in ambiguity? A literature review of party’s positional ambiguity
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
The issue positions of political actors are often ambiguous, resulting in uncertainty on the part of voters. Such ambiguity constitutes a challenge to representation, as it prevents voters from getting a clear understanding of parties’ positions. Ironically, despite growing interest in the concept, the concept itself is remarkably ambiguous: different studies use different conceptualisations of ambiguity, which hampers theory integration. This paper proposes a three-dimensional conceptualization of ambiguity: party positions are ambiguous to the extent that parties deemphasize them, remain vague or inconsistent on them. A review of 103 studies establishes the prevalence of these three dimensions in the literature, shows that most studies focus on a single dimension, and reveals lacunae in the current research on ambiguity. Based on the three-dimensional conceptualisation, the paper then develops a preliminary framework on the causes of ambiguity, outlines key gaps in the literature and suggests promising avenues of theory development.
The issue positions of political actors are often ambiguous, resulting in uncertainty on the part of voters. Such ambiguity constitutes a challenge to representation, as it prevents voters from getting a clear understanding of parties’ positions. Ironically, despite growing interest in the concept, the concept itself is remarkably ambiguous: different studies use different conceptualisations of ambiguity, which hampers theory integration. This paper proposes a three-dimensional conceptualization of ambiguity: party positions are ambiguous to the extent that parties deemphasize them, remain vague or inconsistent on them. A review of 103 studies establishes the prevalence of these three dimensions in the literature, shows that most studies focus on a single dimension, and reveals lacunae in the current research on ambiguity. Based on the three-dimensional conceptualisation, the paper then develops a preliminary framework on the causes of ambiguity, outlines key gaps in the literature and suggests promising avenues of theory development.
From “permanent opposition” to the “power”: Anti-systemic parties in Turkey
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
This study aims to explain why some anti-systemic parties come to power while others remain as permanent opposition or disappear over time. The evidence is sought from the comparative analysis of the socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 1961-1971, permanent opposition) and the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983-1998, in power). In particular, the parties are compared and contrasted in terms of their organizational style, leadership structure, and linkage with the voters. The paper argues that while the TIP built a loose and vertical local organization, the RP had a strong grassroots organization cemented through Islamic ideology. Second, while the RP had an unchallenged leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the TIP had a fragmented leadership resulting from multiple ideological conflicts which undermined the efficiency of the decision-making process and its implementation. Finally, while the TIP was a textbook example of a programmatic party under the guidance of socialist ideology, the RP heavily relied on the distribution of clientelist resources – mostly emanating from its control in the municipalities and central government – to address voters. Overall, the RP took advantage of these strategies to rapidly extend its voter base beyond core voters, particularly in metropolitan areas, while the TIP largely remained restricted to narrow constituencies.
This study aims to explain why some anti-systemic parties come to power while others remain as permanent opposition or disappear over time. The evidence is sought from the comparative analysis of the socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 1961-1971, permanent opposition) and the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983-1998, in power). In particular, the parties are compared and contrasted in terms of their organizational style, leadership structure, and linkage with the voters. The paper argues that while the TIP built a loose and vertical local organization, the RP had a strong grassroots organization cemented through Islamic ideology. Second, while the RP had an unchallenged leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the TIP had a fragmented leadership resulting from multiple ideological conflicts which undermined the efficiency of the decision-making process and its implementation. Finally, while the TIP was a textbook example of a programmatic party under the guidance of socialist ideology, the RP heavily relied on the distribution of clientelist resources – mostly emanating from its control in the municipalities and central government – to address voters. Overall, the RP took advantage of these strategies to rapidly extend its voter base beyond core voters, particularly in metropolitan areas, while the TIP largely remained restricted to narrow constituencies.
Riot in the party? Voter registrations in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021 capitol insurrection
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Following the 6 January 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, news outlets reported that registered Republicans were leaving the party in droves. Drawing on millions of individual-level voter registration records in Florida, we place post-riot party-switching in broader context. We investigate whether Republicans were more likely to experience greater out-migration after the riot, detail to which parties’ individuals switched their allegiances, use a difference-in-difference strategy to determine if the 2021 exodus was greater than 4 years earlier, and examine whether those who decamped from the GOP returned to the fold a year later. We find that registered voters who switched parties after the January 6th uprising were more likely to be white, middle-aged, high-propensity voters, and that Republicans were nearly four times more likely than Democrats to defect following the insurrection. We also find that the GOP defection rate after January 6th was nine times higher than during the same time period in 2017. However, we find that Republican registrants who switched parties post-riot did not migrate to the Democratic Party, but rather became independents, and that a year later, almost no Republicans (only 4.6%) who had defected returned to their GOP roots.
Following the 6 January 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, news outlets reported that registered Republicans were leaving the party in droves. Drawing on millions of individual-level voter registration records in Florida, we place post-riot party-switching in broader context. We investigate whether Republicans were more likely to experience greater out-migration after the riot, detail to which parties’ individuals switched their allegiances, use a difference-in-difference strategy to determine if the 2021 exodus was greater than 4 years earlier, and examine whether those who decamped from the GOP returned to the fold a year later. We find that registered voters who switched parties after the January 6th uprising were more likely to be white, middle-aged, high-propensity voters, and that Republicans were nearly four times more likely than Democrats to defect following the insurrection. We also find that the GOP defection rate after January 6th was nine times higher than during the same time period in 2017. However, we find that Republican registrants who switched parties post-riot did not migrate to the Democratic Party, but rather became independents, and that a year later, almost no Republicans (only 4.6%) who had defected returned to their GOP roots.
Born out of civil wars: Are former rebel parties an organizationally distinct type of party?
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of work on the transformation of formerly rebel groups into political parties. However, there is little work that examines the organizational types of parties that formerly armed groups become. Are these parties more likely to exhibit certain organizational characteristics when compared to other parties? This is an important question especially as scholars consider the role these former rebel parties play in the development of peace and democracy in post-civil war politics. Using data from Daly (2020) and Tuncel and Manning (2022), as well as recently released data from V-Dem on political parties (Coppedge et al 2020) we find that former rebel parties are more clientelistic and personalistic than other parties, even compared to parties in countries where they compete. We suggest that these parties are unlikely to play a constructive role in post conflict democratization.
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of work on the transformation of formerly rebel groups into political parties. However, there is little work that examines the organizational types of parties that formerly armed groups become. Are these parties more likely to exhibit certain organizational characteristics when compared to other parties? This is an important question especially as scholars consider the role these former rebel parties play in the development of peace and democracy in post-civil war politics. Using data from Daly (2020) and Tuncel and Manning (2022), as well as recently released data from V-Dem on political parties (Coppedge et al 2020) we find that former rebel parties are more clientelistic and personalistic than other parties, even compared to parties in countries where they compete. We suggest that these parties are unlikely to play a constructive role in post conflict democratization.
Populist radical-right junior coalition partners and liberal democracy in Europe
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
While many argue populist radical-right parties to be the largest contemporary threat to democracy, much of the evidence either focuses on the rare case of a populist radical-right prime minister, or conflates right-populist prime ministers with right-populist government participation, with some asserting that it would be difficult for these parties to have any real effect without holding the prime ministership. In this paper I conduct a large-scale analysis of European nations to quantify the effect right-populist junior coalition partners have on liberal democracy. I argue that as junior coalition partners, they will indeed affect democratic quality, albeit in ways that differ from that of a right-populist prime minister. While previous literature has demonstrated that populist radical-right parties bring with them decreases in the level of democratic quality pertaining to institutional constraints on power and mass civil liberties, junior coalition partners are only able to effect the latter.
While many argue populist radical-right parties to be the largest contemporary threat to democracy, much of the evidence either focuses on the rare case of a populist radical-right prime minister, or conflates right-populist prime ministers with right-populist government participation, with some asserting that it would be difficult for these parties to have any real effect without holding the prime ministership. In this paper I conduct a large-scale analysis of European nations to quantify the effect right-populist junior coalition partners have on liberal democracy. I argue that as junior coalition partners, they will indeed affect democratic quality, albeit in ways that differ from that of a right-populist prime minister. While previous literature has demonstrated that populist radical-right parties bring with them decreases in the level of democratic quality pertaining to institutional constraints on power and mass civil liberties, junior coalition partners are only able to effect the latter.
Does more matter? Critical mass and legislative influence
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Scholars are divided on whether increased group size helps or hurts political minorities. We test the concept of “critical mass” using a different kind of long-time minority: pre-realignment Republicans in the American South. In Arkansas, after a century of token status, the minority party doubled its numbers in the late 1990s, held steady through the 2000s, then surged to a super majority. This stair-stepped transformation opened a unique window to address a question thus far examined only cross-sectionally: is an outgroup’s influence enhanced by an increase in numbers or does success become less likely as the majority reacts to a growing threat? We find support for the latter. As the minority expands, the likelihood their bills will be adopted, relative to majority bills, decreases markedly. The widened deficit is not, however, the consequence of diminished Republican success, but rather of a Democratic surge.
Scholars are divided on whether increased group size helps or hurts political minorities. We test the concept of “critical mass” using a different kind of long-time minority: pre-realignment Republicans in the American South. In Arkansas, after a century of token status, the minority party doubled its numbers in the late 1990s, held steady through the 2000s, then surged to a super majority. This stair-stepped transformation opened a unique window to address a question thus far examined only cross-sectionally: is an outgroup’s influence enhanced by an increase in numbers or does success become less likely as the majority reacts to a growing threat? We find support for the latter. As the minority expands, the likelihood their bills will be adopted, relative to majority bills, decreases markedly. The widened deficit is not, however, the consequence of diminished Republican success, but rather of a Democratic surge.
A new focus for left-Wing Parties: The salience of low-Wage work In the electoral manifestos of OECD countries
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
The recent mobilization by Living wage movements and unions to raise minimum wages have put the issue of low-wage work at the center of political debates in several countries. To study the position of political parties on this issue, we use electoral manifestos from 18 western democracies from 1990 to 2019. The results show that left-wing parties mention much more often the issue of low-wage work than right-wing parties, especially in countries with a weak degree of corporatism. The different categories of respectively left- and right-wing parties are quite similar in their mentions of low-wage work issues. However, ecologist parties mention low-wage work issues less often than other left parties and radical left parties tend to make broad criticisms of low-wage work more often than center-left parties.
The recent mobilization by Living wage movements and unions to raise minimum wages have put the issue of low-wage work at the center of political debates in several countries. To study the position of political parties on this issue, we use electoral manifestos from 18 western democracies from 1990 to 2019. The results show that left-wing parties mention much more often the issue of low-wage work than right-wing parties, especially in countries with a weak degree of corporatism. The different categories of respectively left- and right-wing parties are quite similar in their mentions of low-wage work issues. However, ecologist parties mention low-wage work issues less often than other left parties and radical left parties tend to make broad criticisms of low-wage work more often than center-left parties.
Populist radical parties, pariahs, and coalition bargaining delays
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Most parliamentary democracies have seen a rise of populist radical parties during the past decades. Many countries have also experienced severely delayed government formation processes, with caretaker governments in office for extended periods of time. Are these delays related to the rise of radical parties? We argue that the rise of populist radical parties may prolong the bargaining process, due to the fact that these parties are often treated as pariahs by other parties during election campaigns, which creates a complex bargaining situation after the election. We evaluate this claim by studying 121 government formation processes in the German States from 1990 until 2021, using original data which includes statements made by parties during election campaigns. The findings show that a higher share of seats allocated to parties from the radical right and radical left results in an increasing amount of days until a new government is voted into office. We also find that when a party that has been characterized as being ‘non-coalitionable’ during the election campaign ends up among the negotiating parties, the government formation process is severely delayed. These findings suggest that the rise of populist radical parties may create severe challenges for parliamentary democracy.
Most parliamentary democracies have seen a rise of populist radical parties during the past decades. Many countries have also experienced severely delayed government formation processes, with caretaker governments in office for extended periods of time. Are these delays related to the rise of radical parties? We argue that the rise of populist radical parties may prolong the bargaining process, due to the fact that these parties are often treated as pariahs by other parties during election campaigns, which creates a complex bargaining situation after the election. We evaluate this claim by studying 121 government formation processes in the German States from 1990 until 2021, using original data which includes statements made by parties during election campaigns. The findings show that a higher share of seats allocated to parties from the radical right and radical left results in an increasing amount of days until a new government is voted into office. We also find that when a party that has been characterized as being ‘non-coalitionable’ during the election campaign ends up among the negotiating parties, the government formation process is severely delayed. These findings suggest that the rise of populist radical parties may create severe challenges for parliamentary democracy.
How party competition shapes ethnic parties’ positions on migration and immigration
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
What positions do ethnic parties adopt on issues related to migration and immigration? We argue that, first, the specific characteristics of the party system – that is, if there are further ethnic parties that compete for votes, in particular among the same ethnic group – matter for the policy profile of ethnic parties on immigration policy. Secondly, we expect that the ideological position of an ethnic party should matter for their immigration policy position: ethnic parties with a more right-wing ideological profile should adopt more negative positions on immigration, in particular, if they face competition from another ethnic party. We use regression analysis and a manually coded sample of ethnic parties based on the Comparative Manifesto Project to test these assumptions. The empirical analysis provides support for our expectations: ethnic parties take more negative immigration positions if they compete with other parties among the same group of ethnic voters and the more the ethnic parties belong to the right wing of the ideological spectrum.
What positions do ethnic parties adopt on issues related to migration and immigration? We argue that, first, the specific characteristics of the party system – that is, if there are further ethnic parties that compete for votes, in particular among the same ethnic group – matter for the policy profile of ethnic parties on immigration policy. Secondly, we expect that the ideological position of an ethnic party should matter for their immigration policy position: ethnic parties with a more right-wing ideological profile should adopt more negative positions on immigration, in particular, if they face competition from another ethnic party. We use regression analysis and a manually coded sample of ethnic parties based on the Comparative Manifesto Project to test these assumptions. The empirical analysis provides support for our expectations: ethnic parties take more negative immigration positions if they compete with other parties among the same group of ethnic voters and the more the ethnic parties belong to the right wing of the ideological spectrum.