Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
During campaigns, parties must defend their reputation of competence on issues to persuade citizens to vote for them (issue ownership). Consequently, what are the most effective strategies to achieve this? I argue that direct (advertising) and indirect (media coverage) communication strategies have different effects on citizens’ perception of party competence. To analyze the impact of campaign dynamics on citizens, I use three data sources: an individual rolling cross-section panel, a media coverage analysis, and a parties’ advertisements analysis. I link those data on a daily basis to capture the dynamics of parties’ communication and citizens' opinion. The results show that advertisements help parties to win and maintain their issue ownership, while media coverage only helps parties to maintain their ownership. The study has scientific and practical implications with regard to party strategy, campaigns, and citizens’ perceptions of parties.
Category Archives: Party Politics:
Party soldiers on personal platforms? Politicians’ personalized use of social media
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Social media are seen as a catalyst for personalized politics, and social media activity has, therefore, been used as an indicator of personalized representation. However, this may lead to an overestimation because politicians can behave as party soldiers even on their personal social media platforms. This article proposes that we need to examine the content of politicians’ social media communication to evaluate levels of personalized representation and understand the drivers behind it. Based on a full year’s Facebook activity of Danish members of Parliament including 28,000 updates, this study documents two main results. First, politicians do use Facebook to manage their personal image, but they also attend to their party duties. Attending to content suggests that activity measures overestimate personalized representation by at least 20 percentage points. Second, in contrast to expectations, mainly electorally secure politicians personalize communication on social media, which suggests that vote getters may enjoy more party duty leeway.
Social media are seen as a catalyst for personalized politics, and social media activity has, therefore, been used as an indicator of personalized representation. However, this may lead to an overestimation because politicians can behave as party soldiers even on their personal social media platforms. This article proposes that we need to examine the content of politicians’ social media communication to evaluate levels of personalized representation and understand the drivers behind it. Based on a full year’s Facebook activity of Danish members of Parliament including 28,000 updates, this study documents two main results. First, politicians do use Facebook to manage their personal image, but they also attend to their party duties. Attending to content suggests that activity measures overestimate personalized representation by at least 20 percentage points. Second, in contrast to expectations, mainly electorally secure politicians personalize communication on social media, which suggests that vote getters may enjoy more party duty leeway.
Lost but not blown away. How do losers of party leadership contests react?
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Many Western parties have opened up the process of leadership selection in order to increase the party’s attractiveness, but negative reactions of losers in such contests might undermine these efforts. It has extensively been documented that losers of elections or referendums become less supportive for the political system, but the question is whether such a winner-loser gap also occurs in the context of intra-party elections. We examine unique panel data collected before and after the leadership elections of the Flemish Christian-Democratic Party and Liberal-Democratic Party and investigate the difference in change in attitudes and behavior of party members who voted for the losing candidates and those who voted for the winner. Contrary to earlier research on candidate selection, we find that only decision acceptance differs between winners and losers, while there is no gap in support for the electoral process, party membership satisfaction, and members’ activity within the party.
Many Western parties have opened up the process of leadership selection in order to increase the party’s attractiveness, but negative reactions of losers in such contests might undermine these efforts. It has extensively been documented that losers of elections or referendums become less supportive for the political system, but the question is whether such a winner-loser gap also occurs in the context of intra-party elections. We examine unique panel data collected before and after the leadership elections of the Flemish Christian-Democratic Party and Liberal-Democratic Party and investigate the difference in change in attitudes and behavior of party members who voted for the losing candidates and those who voted for the winner. Contrary to earlier research on candidate selection, we find that only decision acceptance differs between winners and losers, while there is no gap in support for the electoral process, party membership satisfaction, and members’ activity within the party.
Identity, money, or governance? Explaining secessionist parties’ rhetorical strategies
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Under what conditions do secessionist parties advance identity, socioeconomic or political frames for constitutional change? By performing a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of 93 party manifestos from six Western regions, the results identify a key variable that plays an important role in rhetorical strategies: the governmental status of the party. In linguistically distinctive regions, parties tend to put forward identity frames when in opposition. Instead, being in office is a condition for framing their position in socioeconomic terms. The results concerning political frames are highly complex, although patterns around office holding have also been identified. Hence, the present article shows that office-seeking strategies imply a fundamental change in how these parties frame their claims. Minority nationalist parties take the opportunity of being in office to enhance their credibility as governing parties by downplaying identity issues in favour of a more inclusive and policy-oriented appeal.
Under what conditions do secessionist parties advance identity, socioeconomic or political frames for constitutional change? By performing a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of 93 party manifestos from six Western regions, the results identify a key variable that plays an important role in rhetorical strategies: the governmental status of the party. In linguistically distinctive regions, parties tend to put forward identity frames when in opposition. Instead, being in office is a condition for framing their position in socioeconomic terms. The results concerning political frames are highly complex, although patterns around office holding have also been identified. Hence, the present article shows that office-seeking strategies imply a fundamental change in how these parties frame their claims. Minority nationalist parties take the opportunity of being in office to enhance their credibility as governing parties by downplaying identity issues in favour of a more inclusive and policy-oriented appeal.
Common sense justice? Comparing populist and mainstream right positions on law and order in 24 countries
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
While the subject of populism receives increasing scholarly attention from both political scientists and criminologists, so far these two bodies of literature have existed mostly in isolation of each other. This paper aims to connect them by investigating whether parties that political scientists describe as populist are likely to evince positions on criminal justice that criminologists describe as populist. Relying on a secondary data analysis comparing mainstream right-wing and populist right-wing parties for 131 elections in 24 countries since 1973, this paper concludes that the populist right on average expresses slightly more support for penal populism than the mainstream right, but that its positioning is crucially shaped by considerations relating to issues of immigration and multiculturalism. These findings suggest that most contemporary populist parties on the right primarily pursue a nativist agenda and will only invoke penal populism when it fits this overall strategy.
While the subject of populism receives increasing scholarly attention from both political scientists and criminologists, so far these two bodies of literature have existed mostly in isolation of each other. This paper aims to connect them by investigating whether parties that political scientists describe as populist are likely to evince positions on criminal justice that criminologists describe as populist. Relying on a secondary data analysis comparing mainstream right-wing and populist right-wing parties for 131 elections in 24 countries since 1973, this paper concludes that the populist right on average expresses slightly more support for penal populism than the mainstream right, but that its positioning is crucially shaped by considerations relating to issues of immigration and multiculturalism. These findings suggest that most contemporary populist parties on the right primarily pursue a nativist agenda and will only invoke penal populism when it fits this overall strategy.
Multi-level legislative representation in an inchoate party system: Mass-elite ideological congruence in Brazil
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Research has suggested that fragmented political systems, incohesive parties, and weak programmatic links between voters and legislators can undermine the effectiveness of ideological legislative representation. Using Brazil's national and state assemblies, we examine the potential for voter-elite congruence in a legislative environment considered weak in programmatic representation and highly fragmented by a decentralized political structure. Focusing on 2005–2014, we use mass and elite survey data from the National Congress and 12 state assemblies to estimate deputies' and respondents' ideal points on a common left-right scale. Despite many potential barriers to ideological representation, we find an aggregate pattern of congruence between voters' and politicians' ideological positions during this period, with stronger voter-deputy correspondence for state deputies on average. These patterns are confirmed by a dyadic analysis of deputy and voter characteristics. However, we also find weaknesses in party-level ideological congruence for the major parties—for voters on the left and party supporters on the right. The findings suggest that, while the party system did not prevent overall ideological representation, it may have hindered important aspects of party representation.
Research has suggested that fragmented political systems, incohesive parties, and weak programmatic links between voters and legislators can undermine the effectiveness of ideological legislative representation. Using Brazil's national and state assemblies, we examine the potential for voter-elite congruence in a legislative environment considered weak in programmatic representation and highly fragmented by a decentralized political structure. Focusing on 2005–2014, we use mass and elite survey data from the National Congress and 12 state assemblies to estimate deputies' and respondents' ideal points on a common left-right scale. Despite many potential barriers to ideological representation, we find an aggregate pattern of congruence between voters' and politicians' ideological positions during this period, with stronger voter-deputy correspondence for state deputies on average. These patterns are confirmed by a dyadic analysis of deputy and voter characteristics. However, we also find weaknesses in party-level ideological congruence for the major parties—for voters on the left and party supporters on the right. The findings suggest that, while the party system did not prevent overall ideological representation, it may have hindered important aspects of party representation.
The strategic ambiguity of the radical right: A study of the Danish People’s part
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Though radical right parties are easily identified by their strong nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, significant confusion surrounds their positions on core economic issues, such as taxation and redistribution. This uncertainty may reflect an electoral strategy in which these parties intentionally blur their positions to avoid taking stances on economic issues that divide their target constituencies. Existing research on position blurring and the radical right focuses exclusively on expert surveys and party manifesto statements, providing little information about voter-level perceptions of these parties. This study directly investigates public perception of the positions of the Danish People’s Party, one of the most successful radical right parties in Europe. The study finds strong evidence that the DPP draws on a voter base with below average political awareness, allowing it to more easily recruit voters on opposing sides of economic issues by obscuring its own positions.
Though radical right parties are easily identified by their strong nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, significant confusion surrounds their positions on core economic issues, such as taxation and redistribution. This uncertainty may reflect an electoral strategy in which these parties intentionally blur their positions to avoid taking stances on economic issues that divide their target constituencies. Existing research on position blurring and the radical right focuses exclusively on expert surveys and party manifesto statements, providing little information about voter-level perceptions of these parties. This study directly investigates public perception of the positions of the Danish People’s Party, one of the most successful radical right parties in Europe. The study finds strong evidence that the DPP draws on a voter base with below average political awareness, allowing it to more easily recruit voters on opposing sides of economic issues by obscuring its own positions.
Tweeting apart: Democratic backsliding, new party cleavage and changing media ownership in Turkey
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Turkey plunges headlong into democratic backsliding under Erdoğan’s presidency. The country was a forerunner in the decline of democratic standards in a decade from 2010 to 2020. In the first part of the article, we investigate how this democratic erosion suspends Turkey’s long-standing traditional party cleavage between religious conservatism and secularism. By tracing individuals who follow the members of the Turkish parliament on Twitter, we attach the deputies to their followers with the help of the correspondence analysis. We illustrate that, as the ethnic identity divide remains significant, democracy-authoritarianism cleavage becomes the main party split that brings the supporters of an ideologically diverse group of opposition parties closer. In the second part, we conceptualize the democracy-authoritarianism divide as the main cleavage in Turkish party politics after 2017 to shed light on how the AKP’s different tactics of capturing traditional media generated a partisan media landscape.
Turkey plunges headlong into democratic backsliding under Erdoğan’s presidency. The country was a forerunner in the decline of democratic standards in a decade from 2010 to 2020. In the first part of the article, we investigate how this democratic erosion suspends Turkey’s long-standing traditional party cleavage between religious conservatism and secularism. By tracing individuals who follow the members of the Turkish parliament on Twitter, we attach the deputies to their followers with the help of the correspondence analysis. We illustrate that, as the ethnic identity divide remains significant, democracy-authoritarianism cleavage becomes the main party split that brings the supporters of an ideologically diverse group of opposition parties closer. In the second part, we conceptualize the democracy-authoritarianism divide as the main cleavage in Turkish party politics after 2017 to shed light on how the AKP’s different tactics of capturing traditional media generated a partisan media landscape.
Committee assignment patterns in fragmented multiparty settings: Party personnel practices and coalition management
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
This paper addresses the way parties assign members to parliamentary committees in fragmented multiparty settings. Thus, it analyzes how the two most central institutions of parliamentary politics––political parties and parliamentary committees––interact with one another. To the best of our knowledge, no research into this subject has systematically explored the intersection of considerations based on individual legislator characteristics and coalition management in committee assignment. Using Israel as our case study, we show that legislators' expertise modestly shapes committee assignment patterns. However, parties in coalition often have another set of considerations to take into account when assigning members to committees. We show that parties in coalition do not only bargain on ministerial positions or committee chairs––they also bargain on their members’ assignment to committees and use this resource to allow (or hinder) each other to augment influence and control in a given policy area, or to perform affective monitoring.
This paper addresses the way parties assign members to parliamentary committees in fragmented multiparty settings. Thus, it analyzes how the two most central institutions of parliamentary politics––political parties and parliamentary committees––interact with one another. To the best of our knowledge, no research into this subject has systematically explored the intersection of considerations based on individual legislator characteristics and coalition management in committee assignment. Using Israel as our case study, we show that legislators' expertise modestly shapes committee assignment patterns. However, parties in coalition often have another set of considerations to take into account when assigning members to committees. We show that parties in coalition do not only bargain on ministerial positions or committee chairs––they also bargain on their members’ assignment to committees and use this resource to allow (or hinder) each other to augment influence and control in a given policy area, or to perform affective monitoring.
Let the voters decide: Incumbents, opposition, and contested primaries in Argentina
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Citizens’ ability to influence public decisions is the hallmark of democracy, and central to this are candidate selection mechanisms. Despite the increasing popularity of primaries across the globe, scholars disagree on how incumbency status shapes primary election contests. To address this question, I exploit an electoral reform in Argentina that forces parties and coalitions to participate in primaries, but allows these to be contested or uncontested. Employing an original data set on federal legislative nominations between 2011 and 2017, I show that internal divisions encourage contested primaries within the opposition, to which district-level rivals strategically respond in kind by fielding multiple internal lists to counter any potential electoral “bonus” others may enjoy from contesting in primaries. Combined with the influence of presidents and governors over selection procedures, these patterns entail that primary races are closely fought within the opposition but trouble-free under incumbency status.
Citizens’ ability to influence public decisions is the hallmark of democracy, and central to this are candidate selection mechanisms. Despite the increasing popularity of primaries across the globe, scholars disagree on how incumbency status shapes primary election contests. To address this question, I exploit an electoral reform in Argentina that forces parties and coalitions to participate in primaries, but allows these to be contested or uncontested. Employing an original data set on federal legislative nominations between 2011 and 2017, I show that internal divisions encourage contested primaries within the opposition, to which district-level rivals strategically respond in kind by fielding multiple internal lists to counter any potential electoral “bonus” others may enjoy from contesting in primaries. Combined with the influence of presidents and governors over selection procedures, these patterns entail that primary races are closely fought within the opposition but trouble-free under incumbency status.