Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
While policy appeals receive the bulk of scholars’ attention, recent studies show that group appeals are prevalent in parties' election campaign materials to voters over time. Yet, few studies to date focus on group appeals as a distinct concept, and little data are available to support longitudinal and cross-national examinations. Aiming to better understand group-based appeals’ role in political processes, this article introduces new and unique data using a concise definition of group appeals, contributing to this growing literature. The Parties’ Group Appeals Dataset (PGAD) provides text-as-data from manual analyses of 69 parties' names, 249 manifestos, and 2772 print campaign advertisements in Israel and the Netherlands between 1977 and 2015, offering one of the first (if not the first) opportunities to compare parties' group appeals over time, between countries, and across communication channels.
Category Archives: Party Politics:
Barbarians at the gate: Nativist religious rhetoric and defining the “people” by who they are not
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
The rise of nativist parties in Europe has been accompanied by an increase in religious rhetoric. There is no reason to suggest that voters for nativist parties are motivated by religion, to the contrary, more Christian voters tend to vote for Christian Democratic parties. This article argues that religious rhetoric allows nativist parties to pursue ethno-centric agendas in an acceptable way and differently from Christian Democratic parties. Through the compilation of an original dataset of religious appeals from Austrian, German, and Swiss nativist and Christian Democratic party platforms between 1990–2021, this article demonstrates that changes in the distribution of the religious demographics of Muslims rather than Christians provide a catalyst for religious rhetoric but not an but not an explanation for type of appeal. Instead, the historical role religious identities played in the development of nationalities explains how nativist parties deploy religious rhetoric in the present.
The rise of nativist parties in Europe has been accompanied by an increase in religious rhetoric. There is no reason to suggest that voters for nativist parties are motivated by religion, to the contrary, more Christian voters tend to vote for Christian Democratic parties. This article argues that religious rhetoric allows nativist parties to pursue ethno-centric agendas in an acceptable way and differently from Christian Democratic parties. Through the compilation of an original dataset of religious appeals from Austrian, German, and Swiss nativist and Christian Democratic party platforms between 1990–2021, this article demonstrates that changes in the distribution of the religious demographics of Muslims rather than Christians provide a catalyst for religious rhetoric but not an but not an explanation for type of appeal. Instead, the historical role religious identities played in the development of nationalities explains how nativist parties deploy religious rhetoric in the present.
Party system institutionalization, partisan affect, and satisfaction with democracy
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Citizens’ attitudes about the political parties in their countries have been linked to their overall satisfaction with their democracy, with those feeling great love (hate) for parties feeling more (less) satisfied with the democracy. Such strong positive and negative emotions require time and clear targets to form. This study demonstrates that the influence of interparty affect is greater where the party system has institutionalized. Where the public can be familiar with the parties, their positions, and their relative status in the party system, citizens’ attitudes toward the democracy are more informed by their feelings about the parties in the system. This article draws on 20 years of surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. It demonstrates that the positive effect of positive party affect is greater in institutionalized party systems, while the negative effect of negative party affect is not. This article thus contributes to political science’s understanding of affective polarization, the benefits of party system institutionalization, and popular democratic commitment.
Citizens’ attitudes about the political parties in their countries have been linked to their overall satisfaction with their democracy, with those feeling great love (hate) for parties feeling more (less) satisfied with the democracy. Such strong positive and negative emotions require time and clear targets to form. This study demonstrates that the influence of interparty affect is greater where the party system has institutionalized. Where the public can be familiar with the parties, their positions, and their relative status in the party system, citizens’ attitudes toward the democracy are more informed by their feelings about the parties in the system. This article draws on 20 years of surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. It demonstrates that the positive effect of positive party affect is greater in institutionalized party systems, while the negative effect of negative party affect is not. This article thus contributes to political science’s understanding of affective polarization, the benefits of party system institutionalization, and popular democratic commitment.
Erratum to Explaining the migrant–native vote gap under open-list proportional representation
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Non-linear agenda-building: The impacts of media storms during the 2015 Canadian election
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
A common limitation of most analyses of electoral agenda-building dynamics is that they tend to operate under the assumption that the underlying dynamics between the political actors’ and the media’s agendas are more or less stable across time. Drawing upon recent work on media storms, I theorize that political parties have considerably less influence in periods that are characterized by sudden and explosive increases in media coverage of a particular issue. Using an automated content analysis built around a custom-made dictionary, I examine how parties’ electoral agenda-building efficiency was affected by media storms during the 2015 Canadian federal election. My results support the idea that storm periods diminish parties’ influence on the following day’s media agenda, as the impact of parties’ daily issue attention tend to be weaker. These findings demonstrate the non-linearity of electoral agenda-building dynamics and imply that some electoral contexts are less conducive to political actors’ influence.
A common limitation of most analyses of electoral agenda-building dynamics is that they tend to operate under the assumption that the underlying dynamics between the political actors’ and the media’s agendas are more or less stable across time. Drawing upon recent work on media storms, I theorize that political parties have considerably less influence in periods that are characterized by sudden and explosive increases in media coverage of a particular issue. Using an automated content analysis built around a custom-made dictionary, I examine how parties’ electoral agenda-building efficiency was affected by media storms during the 2015 Canadian federal election. My results support the idea that storm periods diminish parties’ influence on the following day’s media agenda, as the impact of parties’ daily issue attention tend to be weaker. These findings demonstrate the non-linearity of electoral agenda-building dynamics and imply that some electoral contexts are less conducive to political actors’ influence.
Do parties still shape policies in times of crisis? The impact of financial constraints on partisan policymaking in Italy (1996–2018)
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
This paper investigates the effect of macro-economic conditions on partisan policymaking through an analysis of novel data on the fulfilment of 2412 Italian pledges. Are parties able to produce ideologically driven policies even during economic downturns? And how does the economic context affect parties’ capacity to fulfil their pledges? In this paper, I contend that the interaction between macroeconomic conditions and the policymaking process is more complex than it is usually depicted and cannot be restricted to the constraints, financial above all, engendered by a recession period. Results from binary logistic regressions indeed suggest that parties do maintain a certain room for manoeuvre to influence the governing agenda in times of crisis. Even though in some cases pledge fulfilment is severely affected by deteriorations of economic conditions, parties are still able to carry out a large share of their programmatic priorities. Moreover, the economic situation mostly challenges left-leaning governments.
This paper investigates the effect of macro-economic conditions on partisan policymaking through an analysis of novel data on the fulfilment of 2412 Italian pledges. Are parties able to produce ideologically driven policies even during economic downturns? And how does the economic context affect parties’ capacity to fulfil their pledges? In this paper, I contend that the interaction between macroeconomic conditions and the policymaking process is more complex than it is usually depicted and cannot be restricted to the constraints, financial above all, engendered by a recession period. Results from binary logistic regressions indeed suggest that parties do maintain a certain room for manoeuvre to influence the governing agenda in times of crisis. Even though in some cases pledge fulfilment is severely affected by deteriorations of economic conditions, parties are still able to carry out a large share of their programmatic priorities. Moreover, the economic situation mostly challenges left-leaning governments.
Within-party mobility and economic performance in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from China
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
This study analyses a mechanism to explain how internal mobility in the dominant party enhances economic performance. We argue that authoritarian leaders incentivize their political agents to advance economic development by using age-based promotion and retirement rules. We empirically examine our theoretical claim using China’s cadre rejuvenation policy, which rewards younger leaders with more opportunities for career advancement. Drawing on panel data for prefectural party secretaries who were in office at some point between 2000 and 2012, we show that the principle of youthful rejuvenation leads the Communist Party of China to grant more promotions to party leaders who enter office at a younger age than to their older counterparts. Under such an incentive scheme, the regions served by younger entrants into the officialdom have better economic performance than those served by older entrants, holding ability and other regional characteristics constant.
This study analyses a mechanism to explain how internal mobility in the dominant party enhances economic performance. We argue that authoritarian leaders incentivize their political agents to advance economic development by using age-based promotion and retirement rules. We empirically examine our theoretical claim using China’s cadre rejuvenation policy, which rewards younger leaders with more opportunities for career advancement. Drawing on panel data for prefectural party secretaries who were in office at some point between 2000 and 2012, we show that the principle of youthful rejuvenation leads the Communist Party of China to grant more promotions to party leaders who enter office at a younger age than to their older counterparts. Under such an incentive scheme, the regions served by younger entrants into the officialdom have better economic performance than those served by older entrants, holding ability and other regional characteristics constant.
The second-order election model and the performance of political parties in municipal elections
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Elections at the municipal level are often treated as second-order elections (SOE), subordinate to the national electoral arena in a manner similar to the European elections. The original SOE model expects incumbent national parties to perform worse, while predicting smaller and ideologically extreme parties to perform better at the second-order electoral arena compared to the first-order (national) one. Based on a dataset covering aggregate election results in three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Finland) with party-dominated local governments and a time span of more than three decades, we find that the performance of parties in municipal elections only to some degree conforms to the expectations of the model. Parties in national government usually suffer losses in municipal elections, but the effect of incumbency is contingent upon the party size: only large incumbent parties are punished in local elections. We find very weak support for the hypothesis that extreme parties perform better than moderates and suggests that this can be explained by the organisational effort required to field the candidates and campaign in multiple jurisdictions. We conclude that the SOE model should not be applied as a default to municipal elections when explaining political parties’ electoral performance.
Elections at the municipal level are often treated as second-order elections (SOE), subordinate to the national electoral arena in a manner similar to the European elections. The original SOE model expects incumbent national parties to perform worse, while predicting smaller and ideologically extreme parties to perform better at the second-order electoral arena compared to the first-order (national) one. Based on a dataset covering aggregate election results in three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Finland) with party-dominated local governments and a time span of more than three decades, we find that the performance of parties in municipal elections only to some degree conforms to the expectations of the model. Parties in national government usually suffer losses in municipal elections, but the effect of incumbency is contingent upon the party size: only large incumbent parties are punished in local elections. We find very weak support for the hypothesis that extreme parties perform better than moderates and suggests that this can be explained by the organisational effort required to field the candidates and campaign in multiple jurisdictions. We conclude that the SOE model should not be applied as a default to municipal elections when explaining political parties’ electoral performance.
Environmental chauvinism? Explaining issue expansion among non-mainstream parties
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Do non-mainstream parties respond to other non-mainstream parties’ owned issues? Whereas a great deal of extant research has examined the owned issues of non-mainstream parties and when mainstream parties take on these issues, little research has been done to explore when non-mainstream parties expand their issue focus to include the owned issues of other non-mainstream parties. We argue that non-mainstream parties will expand their issue focus as the public salience on the issue increases, but that this expansion is conditioned by the type of issue. In particular, we posit that non-mainstream parties will expand on issues on which there is agreement among their supporters. To test our claims, we examine radical-left, radical right and green parties’ issue expansion on the environment and immigration in 15 West and East European countries from 1980–2018 using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, national election studies, and the Comparative Manifestos Project. Our findings have important implications for non-mainstream parties’ issue evolution and party competition more generally.
Do non-mainstream parties respond to other non-mainstream parties’ owned issues? Whereas a great deal of extant research has examined the owned issues of non-mainstream parties and when mainstream parties take on these issues, little research has been done to explore when non-mainstream parties expand their issue focus to include the owned issues of other non-mainstream parties. We argue that non-mainstream parties will expand their issue focus as the public salience on the issue increases, but that this expansion is conditioned by the type of issue. In particular, we posit that non-mainstream parties will expand on issues on which there is agreement among their supporters. To test our claims, we examine radical-left, radical right and green parties’ issue expansion on the environment and immigration in 15 West and East European countries from 1980–2018 using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, national election studies, and the Comparative Manifestos Project. Our findings have important implications for non-mainstream parties’ issue evolution and party competition more generally.
Partisanship and science advice: Do the right prefer economists and the left social scientists?
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
It is often claimed that parties on the left and right have different preferences for scholarly knowledge. However, little research has addressed whether partisanship actually matters for science advice preferences, particularly in the European setting. Drawing on original data on governmental appointments of academic scholars to more than 1400 public advisory commissions in Norway between 1969 and 2020, this article examines whether the left–right divide matters for cabinets’ consultation of economists and social scientists. The findings reveal that left-wing governments in Norway have consulted scholars of social science—such as sociologists and political scientists—more frequently than right-wing governments. In contrast, partisanship seem to matter less for the consultation of economic scholars, as economists have been extensively used as advisors by both blocs in the period studied. Overall, the article contributes theoretical and empirical knowledge to the politics of science advice.
It is often claimed that parties on the left and right have different preferences for scholarly knowledge. However, little research has addressed whether partisanship actually matters for science advice preferences, particularly in the European setting. Drawing on original data on governmental appointments of academic scholars to more than 1400 public advisory commissions in Norway between 1969 and 2020, this article examines whether the left–right divide matters for cabinets’ consultation of economists and social scientists. The findings reveal that left-wing governments in Norway have consulted scholars of social science—such as sociologists and political scientists—more frequently than right-wing governments. In contrast, partisanship seem to matter less for the consultation of economic scholars, as economists have been extensively used as advisors by both blocs in the period studied. Overall, the article contributes theoretical and empirical knowledge to the politics of science advice.