Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Recent research advancing our understanding of partisan cognitive differences finds symmetrical partisan routes to epistemic hubris: intellectual identity and anti-intellectual affect. These researchers conclude that epistemic hubris is largely due to intellectual identity among Democrats and anti-intellectual affect among Republicans. I investigate whether these relationships are purely due to a greater prevalence of intellectual identity among Democrats and anti-intellectual affect among Republicans or if these constructs are particularly potent in producing epistemic hubris among those who identify with their associated parties. I present observational evidence that partisanship conditions the influence of anti-intellectual affect on epistemic hubris but do not find that partisanship conditions the influence of intellectual identity. Based on these findings, we can expect Red America’s increasing anti-intellectualism to contribute to increasing epistemic hubris. More broadly, I provide empirical support for understanding intellectual identity and anti-intellectualism as distinct concepts based on their differing relationships with other fundamental political concepts.
Category Archives: Party Politics:
Review of Haynes review Atalia Omer and Joshua Lupo
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
United in misperception? How politicians and party electorates assess each other’s policy preferences
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
For representation to work, voters and politicians need to know each other’s policy preferences. While we know that this may not be the case for voters, a growing body of research shows that politicians also regularly misperceive the position of the public or their party’s electorate. However, the two strands of literature are usually not linked, and there is a lack of studies that analyse the mutual (mis)perceptions of citizens and elites. To fill this gap, this paper uses data from three waves of the German Longitudinal Election Study to compare the mutual perceptions of candidates and their party electorates on the left-right scale and on three policy issues. Three findings are noteworthy: First, candidates are only slightly more accurate than voters. Second, in contrast to previous studies, there is no evidence of a conservative bias among politicians. Third, projection plays an important role in both voters’ and candidates' misperceptions. Where both groups think the others are is strongly influenced by their own preferences.
For representation to work, voters and politicians need to know each other’s policy preferences. While we know that this may not be the case for voters, a growing body of research shows that politicians also regularly misperceive the position of the public or their party’s electorate. However, the two strands of literature are usually not linked, and there is a lack of studies that analyse the mutual (mis)perceptions of citizens and elites. To fill this gap, this paper uses data from three waves of the German Longitudinal Election Study to compare the mutual perceptions of candidates and their party electorates on the left-right scale and on three policy issues. Three findings are noteworthy: First, candidates are only slightly more accurate than voters. Second, in contrast to previous studies, there is no evidence of a conservative bias among politicians. Third, projection plays an important role in both voters’ and candidates' misperceptions. Where both groups think the others are is strongly influenced by their own preferences.
It’s my party and I’ll lie if I want to: Elite ideological obfuscation in post-authoritarian settings
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
This paper examines the origins and evolution of the direita envergonhada (“embarrassed right”) phenomenon, a pattern of ideological obfuscation by right-of-center politicians that was originally identified and documented in post-authoritarian Brazil. Conservative politicians refused to identify themselves as right-wing, defining themselves instead as centrists and placing themselves ideologically to the left of their own political parties. We find that this phenomenon is not restricted to Brazil, but is widespread across Latin America’s Third Wave of democratization. We also find that politicians personally connected to the defunct authoritarian regime were more likely to engage in obfuscation and that, contrary to previous hypotheses, obfuscation has faded in recent times.
This paper examines the origins and evolution of the direita envergonhada (“embarrassed right”) phenomenon, a pattern of ideological obfuscation by right-of-center politicians that was originally identified and documented in post-authoritarian Brazil. Conservative politicians refused to identify themselves as right-wing, defining themselves instead as centrists and placing themselves ideologically to the left of their own political parties. We find that this phenomenon is not restricted to Brazil, but is widespread across Latin America’s Third Wave of democratization. We also find that politicians personally connected to the defunct authoritarian regime were more likely to engage in obfuscation and that, contrary to previous hypotheses, obfuscation has faded in recent times.
Common sense, populism, and reactionary politics on Twitter: An analysis of populist far-right common sense narratives between 2008 and 2022
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Far-right parties often depict their ideas as ‘common sense’ and as self-evident, natural, just, and proper. This article examines the extent to which there is a uniform ‘far-right common sense’. Using a mixed-methods computational approach, we analysed Twitter posts mentioning ‘common sense’ from the accounts of far-right parties in the UK, France, Italy, and the USA between 2008 and 2022. Results from our comparative study suggest that uniformity in far-right constructions of common sense is limited by varying socio-economic/political contexts. Meanwhile, our analysis also opens the door for future research on the role of mainstream actors in the legitimisation of reactionary common sense narratives.
Far-right parties often depict their ideas as ‘common sense’ and as self-evident, natural, just, and proper. This article examines the extent to which there is a uniform ‘far-right common sense’. Using a mixed-methods computational approach, we analysed Twitter posts mentioning ‘common sense’ from the accounts of far-right parties in the UK, France, Italy, and the USA between 2008 and 2022. Results from our comparative study suggest that uniformity in far-right constructions of common sense is limited by varying socio-economic/political contexts. Meanwhile, our analysis also opens the door for future research on the role of mainstream actors in the legitimisation of reactionary common sense narratives.
Book Review: Religious Voting in Western Democracies
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Book review:
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Book Review: The Republican Evolution: From Governing Party to Antigovernment Party, 1860-2020
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
‘Party position, electoral incentives, and attention to European Union issues in the 2019 European Parliament election’
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Under what conditions do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) give attention to EU issues in European Parliament (EP) election campaigns? This study examines how party positioning on European integration and individual electoral incentives affected MEPs’ attention to EU issues in the 2019 EP election campaign. Based on data collected from Twitter, the findings show that pro-EU parties and individual vote-seeking incentives increased attention to EU issues. More specifically, they show that MEPs from pro-EU mainstream parties had incentives to debate about EU issues, especially when they competed for votes. The findings help to unfold the interplay between party-level and legislator-level factors and its effects on attention to EU issues and aim to contribute to research on EU issue salience and EP election campaigns.
Under what conditions do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) give attention to EU issues in European Parliament (EP) election campaigns? This study examines how party positioning on European integration and individual electoral incentives affected MEPs’ attention to EU issues in the 2019 EP election campaign. Based on data collected from Twitter, the findings show that pro-EU parties and individual vote-seeking incentives increased attention to EU issues. More specifically, they show that MEPs from pro-EU mainstream parties had incentives to debate about EU issues, especially when they competed for votes. The findings help to unfold the interplay between party-level and legislator-level factors and its effects on attention to EU issues and aim to contribute to research on EU issue salience and EP election campaigns.
State government control and partisan happiness
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Does politics impact happiness? This paper evaluates how being a political “winner” or “loser” – whether one’s preferred party controls government or not – is linked to multiple measures of life satisfaction. Using Gallup survey data on self-reported well-being for Democrats and for Republicans within the U.S. states for 2008–2016 (a time period when party control of government changed in several states) and a difference-in-difference model with two-way fixed effects, I find consistent evidence that citizens report lower levels of well-being when the opposing party controls state government. The substantive effect is particularly large for Democrats living in Republican controlled states. Conversely, there is little evidence that citizens’ well-being is boosted when their own party controls state government. These findings have important implications for our understanding about how partisan competition and election outcomes can impact subjective well-being and further highlight the significance of negative partisanship for American public opinion.
Does politics impact happiness? This paper evaluates how being a political “winner” or “loser” – whether one’s preferred party controls government or not – is linked to multiple measures of life satisfaction. Using Gallup survey data on self-reported well-being for Democrats and for Republicans within the U.S. states for 2008–2016 (a time period when party control of government changed in several states) and a difference-in-difference model with two-way fixed effects, I find consistent evidence that citizens report lower levels of well-being when the opposing party controls state government. The substantive effect is particularly large for Democrats living in Republican controlled states. Conversely, there is little evidence that citizens’ well-being is boosted when their own party controls state government. These findings have important implications for our understanding about how partisan competition and election outcomes can impact subjective well-being and further highlight the significance of negative partisanship for American public opinion.