INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE: MAGIC, RATIONALITY, AND POLITICS—THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF TRADITIONAL BELIEFS

World Affairs, Ahead of Print.
This World Affairs 2023 special issue contains six contributions, including this one, exploring some of the key political consequences of traditional beliefs such as magic and superstition in the developing societies of the Global South as well as in certain industrially advanced societies of the Global North. To show why traditional beliefs matter, we provide an explanation in this introduction for why traditional beliefs exist in developing countries, why they survive in developed countries, and why they may become more popular over time. By utilizing a simple game theoretic approach, we explain why rational people can sometimes increase their payoffs by subscribing to a superstition while superstitious people never gain by switching to rationality. In fact, the superstition—which has no causal connection with the natural course of events—may even yield better results, not only for the individual but also for the group. This is the reason why, in the framework of evolutionary stable equilibrium, superstitious people can demographically dominate an entire population over time. In addition to explaining the existence and the persistence (or the popularity) of traditional beliefs, we highlight the key findings presented in the articles included in this special issue. All of them underline a cardinal point: traditional beliefs matter. They shape electoral behavior, they shape attitudes toward democratic governance, and they influence voters’ assessment of political figures and historical events. Precisely because traditional beliefs have such extensive implications for a country's political life, we believe that in the future scholars will have to pay greater attention to such beliefs to have a better understanding of political phenomena and trends.
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The Metropolis and the Methars: The Struggle for Wage of Manual Scavengers in Colonial Calcutta

Contemporary Voice of Dalit, Ahead of Print.
In the night of colonial Calcutta, soils were collected by the methars. As per Act VI of 1863 regulations, restrictions were imposed on methars. Thus, suitable depots were made and leased to the tollah methars. Since the 1870s, the disposing of the night soils in the river was stopped, and the duty of tollah methars was shifted to the municipality. Chandals was by profession an excluded social category. Even in prison chandals had to clear the night soils of the others. In protest of that prisoners specially methars declared a strike in the prison for months and hence formed a unique bonding that Putnam called ‘social capital’. This article discusses how methars of late colonial Calcutta while upholding the oppression gradually developed ‘social capital’ and started negotiating to establish their justified claims using party politics.

Caste Discrimination Among Indian Diaspora in the USA

Contemporary Voice of Dalit, Ahead of Print.
The large and prosperous Indian diaspora in the USA has earned the epitaph of ‘model minority’, but it obscures the spectre of caste discrimination within. The caste has travelled with the Indians across the globe and keeps rearing its ugly head of discrimination within the community. The article explores the emergence of the Indian diaspora and presence of caste discrimination in the USA. The recent case of caste discrimination against Cisco (MNC) and its Indian employees in California has opened the Pandora box. Since caste is not recognized under any American law, the case has been filed under Civil Rights Act, 1965, which forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, ancestry, national origin/ethnicity and race/colour. Hence, Cisco case is the first opportunity in the United States for caste to be incorporated as a protected legal category at par with race, religion ethnicity and so on. Moreover, it situates the case within larger global Dalit rights movements, their efforts to incorporate caste within the ambit of racism at various international forums and its inclusion as a protected characteristics within the Equality Act, 2010, of the United Kingdom. These efforts are to challenge the caste hegemony at both local and global levels and strive for its eradication.

Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency

Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Political parties increasingly rely on self-regulation to promote ethical standards in office. The adoption of ethics self-regulation and its ability to induce change is likely to be a function of the responses from politicians and voters. Without external enforcement mechanisms, compliance requires support from legislators. In turn, if voters perceive self-regulation as cheap talk, officials have fewer incentives to acquiesce. The extent to which such efforts are rewarded by voters and supported by elected officials remains an open question. We examine this question in a paired conjoint experiment with elected officials and voters in Portugal and Spain. The results show that politicians support (and voters reward) financial disclosures, lobbying registries, and sanctions for MPs involved in corruption cases. Voters also reward term limits, and the effects are not moderated by ideological agreement. The findings suggest that parties can benefit from promoting transparency reforms and are not penalized by experimentation.

Do programme budget mechanisms improve the efficiency of public spending? Elements of theory and empirical data from Cameroon

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Ahead of Print.
This paper sets out to explore the effect of programme budget mechanisms on the efficiency of public spending. To do so, we first conducted an exploratory study among eight officials involved in the preparation and execution of the State budget. This exploratory study then enabled us to construct the variables to produce an analytical model. A survey was carried out among 475 performance chain actors in the central services of 29 ministerial departments of the State of Cameroon. The results obtained using descriptive statistics and simple probit regressions suggest that the mechanisms introduced by the programme budget have a mixed effect on the efficiency of public spending. While, on the one hand, structuring the budget into programmes, actions, activities and tasks, performance measurement indicators and a priori controls on the quality of programmes may have a positive effect on the efficiency of public spending; on the other hand, allocating appropriations according to expected results and costs and a posteriori internal and external budgetary controls have a negative influence on the efficiency of public spending. The study recommends developing the external budgetary controls and introducing internal controls that focus more on performance rather than consistency.