International Review of Administrative Sciences, Ahead of Print.
Policy analytical capacity is a pivotal source of good governance. Although this capacity can be acquired by decision makers in various ways, it is clear that the internal stock of analytical capacity is strategic in terms of supporting policymaking. This stock can be concentrated in specific types of organisational roles (like policy professionals), but it can also be considered a constitutive component of ordinary bureaucratic work. This paper adopts this latter perspective to analyse the characteristics in terms of policy work and analytical capacities of high-level bureaucrats of the central administrations of the Old Southern Four: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The data were collected through a large online survey involving more than 1000 high civil servants. The empirical evidence offered shows the high differentiation in terms of policy work and analytical capacities that characterise the four analysed central bureaucracies and confirms that, despite the expected similarities among the four countries, differences are striking and concern almost all dimensions of analysis. Moreover, Spain has a higher stock of policy analytical capacities. Thus, adopting a policy work perspective can be a fruitful lens for analysing whether and how administrative reforms are capable of penetrating the micro dimensions of administrative behaviour.Points for practitionersThe paper offers the first comparative analysis of the policy work and the analytical capacities of the central administration in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.The results show that, despite the many similarities among the four countries, there are significant differences in terms of ways of working and the held analytical capacities of the high level servants.The offered data show a specific map of policy analytical skills that can be used as a point of departure for designing improvements in high civil servants’ training.

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Ahead of Print.
This paper explores relationships between ministers, special advisers and civil servants through the lens of a high-profile government crisis in Northern Ireland (NI). Although political–administrative relationships are a mainstay of public administration research, we still have limited understanding of how these relationships feature and function within the ‘Westminster family’ of governance when operating within devolved institutions or post-conflict societies, nor of their role in crisis. We use Scott’s institutional pillars as an analytical framework and conduct a documentary analysis of public inquiry witness statements to explore the Renewable Heat Incentive crisis which led to the collapse of the NI legislature. Utilising a novel application of existing theory, we demonstrate that the implementation of the devolved, consociational power-sharing model incubated new governance norms, that prioritised and legitimised the agendas and actions of political actors (ministers and special advisers), over civil servants. Specifically, in understanding how relational norms – particularly distrust – feed public policy failure and institutional crisis, our findings contribute to this research area and to the broader public administration field. Government institutional crisis negatively impacts upon public service delivery and the wider health of democracy. Understanding such crises is an important first step in their amelioration.Points for practitionersStructural, systemic and day-to-day behavioural layering of distrust adversely impacts government professionals’ ability to recognise, communicate and respond to risk; this can create policy problems, which can escalate, unchecked, until they have become full-blown crises. In order to proactively mitigate crises in other public policy contexts, managers and teams should build in awareness raising, reflection and management processes to individual and operational performance reviews to improve relational norms, and prevent the normalisation of distrust.