Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
The organisation of populist radical right parties significantly shapes their long-term electoral success. Within this party family, great organisational variation can be found, with the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) representing a least-likely case: in terms of candidate selection (CS), it ranks much higher on democracy scales than the other Bundestag parties. This paper explores the reasons for this high level of intra-party democracy (IPD) by focusing on three explanatory dimensions: ideology, institutionalisation, and party unity. Methodologically, we apply multivariate analyses of representative quantitative data collected among AfD members at CS prior to the 2017 federal election. The results show that high political dissatisfaction and low levels of institutionalisation are important drivers of inclusive CS procedures. Overall, the article provides a deeper understanding of the underlying attitudes for the AfD’s inclusive IPD, and offers substantial theoretical and empirical implications for future research.
The program-to-campaign linkage: Party organization and ideological inconsistency during election campaigns
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
What determines party strategies in the short run during election campaigns? In this paper, I highlight a novel aspect of party behavior pertaining to the connection between election programs and actual campaign statements issued by party elites in the media. I argue that party leaders may feel compelled to fine-tune their rhetoric and stances during campaigns and thus deviate from their party’s election programs. Nonetheless, their ability to conduct ad-hoc adaptations is limited. The theory I propose posits that two features of party organizations will determine if party leaders can engage in short-term inconsistencies. First, membership-dominated parties will be less likely to be inconsistent because their leaders will fear alienating (the strong) party members and getting punished as a result. Second, parties with strong societal integration—those that maintain strong ties with society and an extensive network of local branches—are more likely to indulge in ideological inconsistency because they establish close bonds with voters based on problem-solving rather than broad ideological principles. I test these dynamics in 14 European democracies between 1972 and 2017 and find strong empirical support. The findings show that intricate party organizations and robust connections with normal citizens influence parties’ short-term strategies during election campaigns.
What determines party strategies in the short run during election campaigns? In this paper, I highlight a novel aspect of party behavior pertaining to the connection between election programs and actual campaign statements issued by party elites in the media. I argue that party leaders may feel compelled to fine-tune their rhetoric and stances during campaigns and thus deviate from their party’s election programs. Nonetheless, their ability to conduct ad-hoc adaptations is limited. The theory I propose posits that two features of party organizations will determine if party leaders can engage in short-term inconsistencies. First, membership-dominated parties will be less likely to be inconsistent because their leaders will fear alienating (the strong) party members and getting punished as a result. Second, parties with strong societal integration—those that maintain strong ties with society and an extensive network of local branches—are more likely to indulge in ideological inconsistency because they establish close bonds with voters based on problem-solving rather than broad ideological principles. I test these dynamics in 14 European democracies between 1972 and 2017 and find strong empirical support. The findings show that intricate party organizations and robust connections with normal citizens influence parties’ short-term strategies during election campaigns.
The effect of primaries on voters’ evaluation of candidates’ quality–experimental evidence
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
In this article, I argue that voters not only rely on characteristics of candidates, such as age and gender, but also on procedural cues to evaluate candidates, particularly on how candidates were selected. I argue that selection via primaries, which has become popular in Western Europe, is an important cue to voters. Drawing on procedural fairness theory, I develop contradicting arguments about how primaries affect voters’ evaluations of candidate quality, such that either the logic of procedural fairness improves voters’ evaluations of candidates’ quality, or the violation thereof through clientelism and vote-buying leads to worse evaluations of candidates. I employ a conjoint experiment, implemented in Spain, and analyze responses to an open-ended question to investigate underlying mechanisms. The findings indicate that voters perceive candidates resulting out of primaries as outsiders, who are less corrupt but also less experienced and less competent.
In this article, I argue that voters not only rely on characteristics of candidates, such as age and gender, but also on procedural cues to evaluate candidates, particularly on how candidates were selected. I argue that selection via primaries, which has become popular in Western Europe, is an important cue to voters. Drawing on procedural fairness theory, I develop contradicting arguments about how primaries affect voters’ evaluations of candidate quality, such that either the logic of procedural fairness improves voters’ evaluations of candidates’ quality, or the violation thereof through clientelism and vote-buying leads to worse evaluations of candidates. I employ a conjoint experiment, implemented in Spain, and analyze responses to an open-ended question to investigate underlying mechanisms. The findings indicate that voters perceive candidates resulting out of primaries as outsiders, who are less corrupt but also less experienced and less competent.
The relationship between female labor force participation and violent conflicts in South Asia
Exclusion of Climate Migrants from the Global Compact on Refugees
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The Cuerpo-Territorio of Displacement: A Decolonial Feminist Geopolitics of Re-Existencia
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BEYOND CONVENTIONAL BOUNDARIES
World Affairs, Volume 186, Issue 3, Page 747-775, FALL 2023.
According to conventional wisdom, organized criminal activity is perpetrated primarily by non-state, private actors who are occasionally [or not] protected by corrupt government officials. From this perspective, a hard distinction is made between those who provide protection to criminals (e.g., politicians or law enforcement officials) and the criminals themselves (e.g., smugglers or producers of counterfeit goods). It further treats the involvement of state-affiliated actors as a by-product of corruption in public office, rather than, in some places, a feature of it. This article builds on emerging evidence that state representatives play a far more direct role in supervising, organizing and sometimes managing crime than assumed in the majority of the literature. It shows that there are inherent theoretical, policy-level biases that misguide the analytical thinking about organized crime in the Global South, and argues that there is a need to reconsider existing approaches to develop more accommodative definitions of organized crime.
According to conventional wisdom, organized criminal activity is perpetrated primarily by non-state, private actors who are occasionally [or not] protected by corrupt government officials. From this perspective, a hard distinction is made between those who provide protection to criminals (e.g., politicians or law enforcement officials) and the criminals themselves (e.g., smugglers or producers of counterfeit goods). It further treats the involvement of state-affiliated actors as a by-product of corruption in public office, rather than, in some places, a feature of it. This article builds on emerging evidence that state representatives play a far more direct role in supervising, organizing and sometimes managing crime than assumed in the majority of the literature. It shows that there are inherent theoretical, policy-level biases that misguide the analytical thinking about organized crime in the Global South, and argues that there is a need to reconsider existing approaches to develop more accommodative definitions of organized crime.
Book review: Review of Alex Marland and Thierry Giasson, eds., Inside the local campaign: Constituency elections in Canada
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Political communication on Facebook: Do populist parties send out more posts?
Party Politics, Ahead of Print.
Scholars connect the rise of populist parties and the growing importance of social media platforms for political communication as the emerging social media logic seems well-suited to populist communication. The following research note presents a novel dataset that connects Facebook accounts to party-level populism data from the POPPA database. Over 600,000 posts from 226 parties between 2017 and 2019 were analysed. The results show that in most European countries, populist parties are more active than non-populist parties on Facebook. However, high variation in the frequency of posts emphasises that country-specific aspects play an important role. Generally, Italian parties are much more active than those from other countries, whereas those in Northern and Western Europe are the least active. The most active party in Europe, the Italian right-wing populist Lega, showed the most extreme level of activity: its daily activity is around 20 times higher than the median. Furthermore, this analysis highlights why researchers should carefully check Facebook data for implausible inactivity and how connecting different data resources can help overcome potential biases resulting from missing data. Future studies analysing any party communication on Facebook will benefit from the insights and the list of party accounts featured herein.
Scholars connect the rise of populist parties and the growing importance of social media platforms for political communication as the emerging social media logic seems well-suited to populist communication. The following research note presents a novel dataset that connects Facebook accounts to party-level populism data from the POPPA database. Over 600,000 posts from 226 parties between 2017 and 2019 were analysed. The results show that in most European countries, populist parties are more active than non-populist parties on Facebook. However, high variation in the frequency of posts emphasises that country-specific aspects play an important role. Generally, Italian parties are much more active than those from other countries, whereas those in Northern and Western Europe are the least active. The most active party in Europe, the Italian right-wing populist Lega, showed the most extreme level of activity: its daily activity is around 20 times higher than the median. Furthermore, this analysis highlights why researchers should carefully check Facebook data for implausible inactivity and how connecting different data resources can help overcome potential biases resulting from missing data. Future studies analysing any party communication on Facebook will benefit from the insights and the list of party accounts featured herein.